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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT
Jurisdiction is appropriate with the Supreme Court pursuant to U.C. A. § 78-2-2(3)(j).
Final judgment in this case was entered on March 14, 2001. Notice of Appeal wasfiledon
April 9, 2001.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

DID THE COURT ERR IN INTERPRETING THE 52 AMENDMENT TO
THE 52 CONTRACT BY GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
PRECLUDING THAYN FROM USING ITS 600 CFS NON-CONSUMPTIVE
STATE APPROVED WATER RIGHT YEAR ROUND AND LIMITING HIM
TO 435 CFS DURING THE IRRIGATION SEASON ONLY?
Interpretation of contracts is a question of law which is reviewed for correctness.

Levanger v Vincent, 3 p.3d 187 (Ut. 2000). The existence of an ambiguity in a contract is
a question of law. MunfordvLee Servicing Co., 999 P.2d 23 (Ut. App. 2000). The matter
was preserved for appeal by virtue of memorandums in opposition to the original motion for
summary judgment, (R. 151-153 a-v) and in opposition to the motion of GRCC for partial
summary judgment (R. 454-472).
II

DID THE COURT ERR IN HOLDING THAT THAYN HAD A DUTY TO
DISCOVER THE "UNRECORDED" 52 AMENDMENT AND BINDING HIM
TO SAID AMENDMENT DESPITE THE FACT THAT NO NOTICE WAS
EVER PROVIDED TO HIM UNTIL AFTER THE HYDRO ELECTRIC
PLANT HAD BEEN BUILT?
The Supreme Court gives no deference to a trial courts ruling on legal issues. A.R.v

C.R. 982 P.2d 73 (Ut. 1999): An Appellate Court reviews questions of law for correctness.
Marcis & Associates, Inc. v Neways, Inc., 986 P.2d 748 (Ut. App. 1999). This issue was
t

reserved at virtually every stage of the proceedings. Thayn first raised it in his original
Affidavit in Support of Summary Judgment and in Opposition to the Motion for Summary
Judgment by GRCC (R. 40-45). It was further raised in objection to the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law. (R. 1419-1424).
III.

DID THE COURT ERR IN CONSTRUING THE CONTRACT IN A MANNER
THAT VIOLATES PUBLIC POLICY AND AFFORDING AN EQUITABLE
REMEDY THEREFOR?
The Court of Appeals review legal issues for correctness. Harmon City Inc. v Draper

City, 997 P.2d 371. The Supreme Court reviews statutory interpretations for correctness and
gives no deference to the conclusions of the trial court. Adkins v Uncle Barts, Inc. 1 P.3d
528 (Utah 2000). The issue was preserved by arguments made at the hearing on Summary
Judgment, (R. 1905) and the two Motions for Reconsideration filed by Thayn.
IV.

DID THE COURT ERR IN DENYING THAYN FROM HIS STATUTORY
RIGHTS UNDER U.C.A. § 73-1-6,7 INSOFAR AS POWER GENERATION
FOR SALE IS CONCERNED?
The Court of Appeals reviews legal decisions for correctness. Harmon City Inc. v

Draper City, 997 P.2d 321 (Ut. App. 2000). The Supreme Court reviews statutory
interpretations for correctness and gives no deference to the conclusions of the trial court.
Adkins v Uncle Bart's, Inc., 1 P.3d 528 (Ut. 2000). This issue was preserved for appeal by
virtue of the arguments made in the Memorandum in Support for Summary Judgment,
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 151-153 a-v), the Motion to File
Supplemental Complaint (R. 208-241) which motion was denied by the trial court. (R. 242244).
2

V.

DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN ASSESSING ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR
DENIAL OF THE MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION WHEREIN
GRCC WAS BUILDING AN OBSTRUCTION WALL TO IMPEDE THAYN'S
WATER IN THE CANAL DURING THE COURSE OF THIS ACTION,
WHICH CONDUCT WAS IN BLATANT VIOLATION OF U.C.A. § 73-1-15?
Inasmuch as the Supreme Court reviews statutory interpretation for correctness and

gives no deference to the conclusions of the trial court. Adkins vs Uncle Bart's Inc., 1 P.3d
528 (Ut. 2000). The issue was preserved in the lower court with a memorandum in objection
to the application for attorney's fees. (R. 761-772).
VI.

DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN APPLYING THE STANDARDS OF
ESTOPPEL, WAIVER AND LATCHES AND IN CONCLUDING THAT
GRCC HAD NO DUTY TO PROTEST THAYN'S WATER FILING IF GRCC
INTENDED TO RELY ON ITS INTERPRETATION OF THE 52
AMENDMENT?
The Court of Appeals reviews legal issues for correctness. Harmon City Inc. v

Draper City, 997 P.2d 321 (Ut. App. 2000). The Supreme Court gives no deference to the
trial courts ruling on legal issues. A.R.v C.R. 982 P.2d 73 (1999).
These issues were reserved in the record by virtue of Defendant's Objection to the
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 1419-1424) and its Post Trial
Memorandum Regarding Estoppel, Waiver and Latches (R. 1242-1282).
VII. DID THE COURT ERR GRANTING GRCC'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN PRECLUDING EVIDENCE AT TRIAL
REGARDING MAINTENANCE ISSUES, WHILE ALLOWING GRCC TO
ATTEST IT WAS NOT GETTING ITS WATER?
The judgment of the trial court admitting or excluding evidence will not be reversed
unless it is shown that the discretion therein has been abused. Terry v Zions Coop

3

Mercantile Institute, 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979) overruled on other grounds, McFarland v
Skaggs Co., Inc., 678 P.2d 298 (Utah 1984). "Abuse of discretion" means a trial court has
exceeded the range of discretion allowed for a particular act under review; it should not be
misread to imply a conscious and intentional violation of permitted discretion by the trial
judge. Riviera v State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 1 P.3d 539 (Utah 2000). The Supreme
Court applies the same standard as the trial court on review of a Motion for Summary
Judgment, Briggsv Holcomb, 740 P.2d 281 (Ut. App. 1987).
This issue was reserved by objection and arguments made at trial in attempt to get
said evidence admitted. (R. 1902, U. L, pp. 74-87.) It was specifically raised in answer to
GRCC's Second Supplemental Complaint wherein GRCC asserted it was not getting its full
80cfs. (R. 256, 258.)
VIII. DID THE COURT ERR IN MAKING FINDINGS OF FACT AGAINST THE
CLEAR AND UNDISPUTABLE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE?
The Supreme Court upholds the lower court's findings of fact unless the evidence supporting
them is so lacking that the court must concede the finding is clearly erroneous. Desert Miriah, Inc.
v B & L Auto, Inc., 12 p.3d, 580 (Ut. 2000). This issue was preserved in the record by objections
to the findings of fact and post trial memoranda (R. 1419-1424; 981-1019; 1192-1220).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Approximately six (6) miles north of the City of Green River, Utah lies certain water
diversion facilities at the heart of this dispute. (Ex. 54, A-l). Spanning the width of the
Green River is a crescent shaped concrete dam, which serves to raise the height of the water
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some eight feet (R.1905, p.6; Ex. 54, A-l). While the bulk of the water spills over the dam
and continues on downstream, water is nonetheless diverted at both banks of the river. (R.
1905. p.6). On the east, water is channeled to the Eastside Water Users, (Ex. 54, A-6). On
the west bank, water is channeled to the parties herein. Plaintiff/Appellee Green River Canal
Company (hereinafter "GRCC") consists of approximately thirty-one (31) stockholders,
seven (7) of which have modest sized farms, and the remainder of which utilize water for
domestic irrigation and/or stock watering. (Ex. 54, Appendix 1). Total acreage by survey
being served by GRCC is 1,443.50. (R. 1369). GRCC holds a state approval water right for
a maximum flow of 60 cfs during the irrigation season, inclusive of a 20 cfs stock watering
right year round. (R. 1353,1365-1369). Further, GRCC is subject to a "duty" or limitation
of 5,774.00 acre feet per annum for irrigation and 75.60 for stock watering. (R. 1369).
Defendant/Appellant Lee Thayn (hereinafter "Thayn") is the successor in interest to
a farm and appurtenant water rights purchased from Wilson Produce Company (hereinafter
"Wilson") under a contract for sale in 1979. Thayn's farm is approximately 1,362 acres. (R.
40-45, Ex. 54, Appendix A-2).
In addition to the dam, the west side diversion facilities consist of a 40 foot wide
2,500 foot long unlined canal (hereinafter referred to as the "raceway"). (R.40-45; Ex. 54 A2). The dam lies on state property (Green River) and a portion of the raceway crosses
Bureau of Land Management property, with the lower portion of the raceway crossing
GRCC property and Thayn property. (Ex.54, Figure A-2). Diverted water flows southerly
down the raceway through a set of "control gates" which can be utilized to restrict the flow
5

of water for maintenance or repair on the raceway. (R. 40-45, Ex. 54 A-3 and Figure A-2).
Water continues to the foot of the raceway wherein a significantly smaller canal owned by
GRCC continues the flow to its shareholders southerly, towards the city of Green River, (id).
GRCC has a headgate at the point its ditch meets the raceway to either permit or restrict
water to flow into its ditch, (id).
Perpendicular to, and abutting directly east of the GRCC canal inlet, along the east
bank of the raceway, at the foot of the raceway, is a building known as the pump
house/power house, which building also abuts the west side of the Green River. (R. 1905, p.6,
Ex. 54, Figure A-2). Incorporated into the pump house is a set of "radial gates" which can
be opened to flush water through the raceway rapidly, returning virtually the entire flow of
the raceway back to the river. (R. 1905, p.7, Ex. 54, Figure A-2). Periodically Thayn opens
the radial gates briefly to flush silt and sand buildup from the raceway. (R. 40-45). When
the radial gates are closed, all raceway water not flowing down GRCC's canal goes under
the pump house through a set of turbines or to Thayn's irrigation pumps. As originally
acquired from Wilson, there were two (2) turbines providing mechanical power to two (2)
pumps to lift Thayn's irrigation water some forty-two (42) feet to Thayn's canal running
along a hillside to the east of GRCC's property. (R. 40-45, Ex. 54, Figure A-2.). The
facilities were originally constructed in 1906, by Pearson and Taft (Wilson's predeceasor)
(R. Ex.54, A-5, E-25). There was no substantial improvement or modification to the
facilities until Thayn renovated, upgraded and put in a small co-generation facility in 1992
at a cost of some $300,000, spawning the present action. (R. 40-45).
6

Lee Thayn and his brother Leon Thayn originally contracted to purchase the farm and
water rights from Wilson in 1979 (R. 40). At the time of closing (1981) of the property, the
following water rights were established of record with the State Engineer's Office: Nov. 17,
1933 Certificate of Appropriation filed by Wilson for 35 second feet (consumptive) for
irrigation March 1 to December 1, of each year, approved 10/13/52, certificate No. 4617;
(Ex. 54, Appendix 2) Application to Appropriate Water, 600 cfs for power, noting plant has
been in operation since 1907, approved 4/1/75 (non-consumptive) (id) , Application No.
44455 and Change Application No. A-12054 filed by Wilson at Thayn's request on 5/11/81
to have the 600 cfs power right be year round, approved 9/2/83 (without protest by
GRCC)(R. 82-84; See also R. 40-45). GRCC's water right is 60 cfs with a5,904 acre foot
limitation.
After purchase of the property in 1979, Thayn and his brother initially attempted a
large scale hydro-electric project in conjunction with National Hydro Corporation of Boston,
Mass. (R. 43). That project was known as the National Hydro project and called for
expansion of the raceway to accommodate 4,100 cfs non-consumptive. (R. 43-44). Thayn
applied for the 1,400 cfs from the State, (Ex. 54, Appendix 2) which was originally protested
by GRCC. Eventually a proposed contract was entered into with GRCC and Thayns
regarding the National Hydro project, which contract obligated GRCC to provide land for
development of a new, enlarged power house, and expansion of the raceway, together with
withdrawal of the protest filed by GRCC to the application for 1,400 cfs. Thayns were not
obligated to proceed with National Hydro, but if it was eventually built, GRCC would
7

receive one percent (1%) of the hydro-electric proceeds for 15 years, and two percent (2%)
thereafter, less 863,000 Kilowatt hours which was calculated as Thayns power demand to
pump his irrigation water. (R. 44; Ex. 54, Appendix 1). Wilsons and Thayns had been using
their approved 600 cfs to supply the "power demand" of the pumps.
National Hydro fell through due to environmental protests and other reasons. (R.44).
Thayn learned of the April 15,1952 agreement between GRCC and Wilson at about the time
they purchased the property. (R. 40-45; Ex. 54, Appendix 1). This agreement purports to
be a covenant running with the land, (Ex. 45). None of the copies of the April 1, 1952
agreement (hereinafter "52 agreement") submitted at summary judgment or trial show any
recording with either the State Engineers' office or the County Recorder. However, a copy
of the 52 agreement in the National Hydro Federal Energy Regulator Commission (FERC)
Application shows an instrument No. 79787, that was found in County records Book E. (Ex.
54, Appendix 1). The 52 agreement was a settlement of disputes between GRCC and
Wilson, including a then pending lawsuit as to which party owned which facilities, who
would pay maintenance costs, and the priorities of water rights. Under the agreement, the
dam, portions of the raceway and certain real property were transferred by Wilson to GRCC,
the pump house, and all appurtenances were to be deeded to Wilson, parties were to split
equally the maintenance costs on the dam and raceway, and priority of water usage was set
forth in paragraph 6 as follows:

It is understood and agreed that before the party of the second part can or may
use any water from said dam, diverting works or raceway that the first party
8

shall have enough and sufficient water to supply its stockholders. The
quantity of water to supply the stock holders of the first party is to be
exclusively determined by the first party.
Further, each party covenanted to cooperate with the other for mutual use and benefit
of the facilities. (R. 107-113; 67-73).
After failure of National Hydro, Thayn re-explored a small co-generation project, and
ultimately obtained a FERC exemption for a small scale co-generation facility. (R.44), at
which time they met Rick Kaster. (R. 1902, V. IV., p.77).

Rick Kaster works on

hydroelectric plants, pumps and mechanical things. (R. 1902, V. Ill, p. 176). Mr. Kaster
made a proposal in 1988 regarding refurbishing of the pump house and perhaps selling
power surplus over and above Thayn's pumping needs to finance the rebuilding. (R. 1902
V. Ill, p. 180-181). Mr. Kaster first focused on rebuilding the pumps, cleaning up the
building and prep work. (R. 1902 V. Ill, p. 187-188). In late 1989 or early 1990 he began
looking for turbines and generators (id). In the summer of 1990 he found some used
equipment that would match this site, and the decision was made to commence the project.
(R. 1902, V. Ill, pp. 90,191). A verbal agreement was made among Lee Thayn, Leon Thayn
and Rick Kaster to share profits as to the surplus power generated by the newer, more
efficient turbines and ownership of the turbines and generators. (R. 1902, V. Ill, pp. 96-98).
Both Kaster and Leon Thayn told numerous people of their intent to go forward with a cogeneration facility. (R. 1902, B. IV, p 9, V, III, p. 9) including attending meetings with
GRCC. (R. 1902, V. Ill, p. 56-57). It was common knowledge throughout the area that
Thayns were doing the co-generation project. (R. 1902, V. Ill, p. 111; see also testimony
9

of Clinton Thompson, ditch rider for GRCC, (R. V. I, p.87); Blaine Silliman, GRCC Board
member and vice-president in 1989 and President 1991-92, (R. 1902 R. V. I, p.138); Olive
Anderson, Green River City councilwoman and GRCC shareholder, (R. 1902, V. I., p. 156);
Bernard Lassen, GRCC shareholder, (R. 1902 V. I., p. 167); Odell Anderson, Green River
resident, (R. 1902, V. I, p. 188-190); Robert Seely, GRCC shareholder, (R. 1902 V. I, p.
200). GRCC minutes reflect the board's knowledge of Thayns co-generation project. (Ex.
98, minutes of 1/9/90, 1/7/92, 3/26/92). In fact, the 1/7/92 minutes of GRCC discloses that
Leon Thayn told GRCC the amount Utah Power and Light would pay for the electricity to
be generated. (Ex. 98). The facility was rebuilt and went online in May 1992. (R. 1902, V.
IV, p.36). After Thayn began generating electricity the board presented Thayns with an
"amendment" to the 1952 agreement dated September 30,1952, which had also been signed
by Wilson. (R. 1902, V. IV, pp.84-85; see also Ex. 66). Neither Thayns nor Kaster would
have proceeded with the project if there had been any question about the right to use the 600
cfs non-consumptive year round. (R. 1902, V. IV, pp. 13,82). By the time GRCC presented
the September 1952 amendment (hereinafter "52 amendment") Thayns had already
expended over $300,000 in the project. (R. 40-45). Nowhere in the record is there any
evidence that the 52 amendment was recorded or filed with the State Engineer's office.
The 52 amendment provides in relevant part that:
That the meaning of paragraph 6 of said original agreement was intended to
be that the first party should have a priority of diversion, and should be
entitled to take whatever water should be needed by the said first party or its
stockholders before the second party should be entitled to divert any water
through or over the dam and diversion works; and that the quantity of water
10

needed should be exclusively determined by the said first party. However, it
was and is also mutually understood and agreed that the first party claims for
the uses of its stockholders 80 second feet of water as particularly set forth in
that certain diligence claim No. 46 on file and of record in the office of the
State Engineer of the State of Utah and that after said rights are satisfied
through diversion at said dam and diverting works that the water rights of the
second party as set forth in its water filing about to be issued by said State
Engineer for 35 second feet of water for irrigation uses upon approximately
1,325 acres of land, as well as its filings for power purposes to pump said
water not to exceed 400 second feet or such lesser amount as may be approved
by the State Engineer of the State of Utah shall then be satisfied through
diversions at said dam and diverting works before any other or additional
diversions are made, by the first party. [Emphasis added]
This lawsuit then ensued. GRCC filed its original complaint on 6/17/95 (R.I.-2)
alleging breach of contract (Count One) for utilizing the diversion works in excess of the 52
amendment, breach of contract (Count Two) for assigning a portion of his rights to a third
party, equitable relief (Count Three) loss of profits and for an injunction (Count Four).
Thayn answered and counterclaimed denying that GRCC owned all of the diversion
facilities, admitting that his predecessor in interest entered into the 52 agreement and the 52
amendment, but denying that GRCC's interpretation of the agreement and the amendment
precluded his use of his water right for co-generation activity. As affirmative defenses,
Thayn raised the doctrine of de minimis non curat lex, arguing that the real nature of the
breach of contract and injunction claims was not for damages, but was an attempt to extort
profits from Thayn. Thayn further averred that U.C. A. §73-1-7 provided a right of eminent
domain to Thayn, that GRCC had an adequate remedy at law if in fact any damages really
occurred, and raised laches, estoppel and waiver. Thayn also counterclaimed for his attorney
fees and costs. (R. 23-28).
11

On June 28, 1996 Thayn filed a Motion for Summary Judgment together with the
Affidavit of Lee Thayn pointing out that while Wilson, Thayn's predecessor, had initially
filed a water right claim for 35 cfs consumptive and 600 cfs non-consumptive power, during
irrigation season only, in 1975, subsequently Wilson, on behalf of Thayn, filed a second
application with the State Engineer's office in 1981. This second application was to change
the non-consumptive 600 cfs power use to year round. (R. 50-51). Both applications were
approved. (R. 40-45). Thayn argued that inasmuch as there was never an increase or actual
change of use by Wilson, and no modifications were made to the diversion facilities, and
because GRCC had never objected to Wilson's use or protested Water Right applications
filed by him, or alleged any breach of contract as against Wilson, that Thayn's use of 600
cfs for hydroelectric power generation and irrigation power pumping should not be
prohibited under the contract. Thayn sought summary judgment under theories of estoppel,
latches or waiver. Thayn further argued the contract and amendment set up only a system
of priorities and that the terms of the amendment as to the parties' various water rights were
intended only as descriptive of the parties' rights, not intending to forever preclude through
the eons of time any future water rights or water right usages. Alternatively, Thayn argued
he had a statutory right of eminent domain to utilize the raceway, provided he pay any
damages said use might cause and contribute pro-rata to maintenance of the dam and
raceway under U. C. A. § 73-1-7.
As to the claim for profits by GRCC, Thayn cited numerous cases that the measure
of damages for a canal appropriator is not the benefit to the appropriator, but the diminution
12

in value to the canal company. Accordingly, under the facts of the present case, GRCC
would get only minimal damages. (R. 48-85).
GRCC filed its own Motion for Summary Judgment on the same date, 6/28/96
asserting that the 52 agreement and amendment must be interpreted as not merely descriptive
of the parties' water rights, but as the quantative limit of both the rights and uses of the
parties, and any successors in interest, forever and ever. Inasmuch as GRCC had no
substantive damages, they argued for injunctive relief and specific performance. (R.
910104).
In opposition to Thayn's Motion for Summary Judgment, GRCC argued estoppel was
not applicable, that Thayn could not reasonably rely upon GRCC's inaction over some 40
years as a basis for constructing a $300,000 co-generation facility.

Further, GRCC

contended that U.C.A. § 73-1-7 requires a "proceeding" and that mere affirmative defense
is inapplicable. It then argued that nominal damages are an inadequate remedy at law, and
accordingly an injunction should issue. (R. 117-143).
In response, Thayn filed a Motion for leave to file an amended and supplemental
counterclaim seeking to raise U.C.A. § 73-1-7 as a counterclaim as well as an action to seek
enlargement/clean out of the raceway. (R. 148-150).
Thayn responded to GRCC's Motion for Summary Judgment by pointing out the
amendment expressly purports to clarify paragraph six (6) of the 52 agreement. That said
amendment set up a system of priorities by which GRCC would not have an unlimited first
position priority. Thayn further contended that the amendment language is ambiguous and
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that the court should look to the parties' course of conduct in interpreting the intent of the
agreement. Since Wilson had attained a water right of 600 cfs, non-consumptive power
right, and since no enlargement of the facilities had taken place since 1952 and Wilson's use
of the water never changed, the Court should construe the contract in accordance with the
parties' own conduct. Thayn pointed out the lack of protest by GRCC to Wilson's 1975 and
1981 water right applications and contrasted that to the 1981 application filed by Wilson
with respect to the National Hydro contract (to which GRCC did protest but subsequently
withdrew its protest after agreeing to the National Hydro project). That application sought
1,400 cfs. If, in fact, Wilson's 600 non-consumptive power right was a violation of the 52
agreement, why did not GRCC protest? Thayn points out the Vetere Affidavit which claims
GRCC did not know of Thayn's purported use for co-generation until 1992 is not a defense
to estoppel; that it is the quantity of the non-consumptive water right to which Thayn sought
to estopp GRCC. How Mr. Thayn chooses to best use his water right was not a proper
inquiry for the Court. (R. 151-153).
Thayn further addressed GRCC's argument that the value of a canal company rests
in its ability to exclude others. Thayn argued there is no basis in law for such reasoning, that
by virtue of U.C.A. § 73-1-7 the canal company does not possess the right to exclude, only
the right to demand contribution of maintenance costs, and dimuneration in value to GRCC,
if any. (R. 153 K-P).
In reply, GRCC argued latches was inapplicable because it asserted Thayn did not put
GRCC on notice of Thayn's plans for the small co-generation facility. GRCC asserted that
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mere silence is ineffective to constitute a waiver without an affirmative duty to speak.
GRCC argued Thayn had a duty of good faith to abide by the contract, so it had no duty to
speak out. Finally GRCC maintained U.C.A. § 73-1-7 is unconstitutional if it allows
interference with their private property rights. However, says GRCC, since the parties here
have a contract, the contract controls and U.C.A. §73-1 -7 is inapplicable. (Citing GunnisonFayette Canal Co. v Roberts, 12 Utah 2d 153, 364 P.2d 103, 105 (1961).
Oral argument on the pending Summary Judgment motions were heard on October
15, 1996, after which the Court, Hon. Bryce K. Bryner presiding, took the matter under
advisement.

(R. 186). Thereafter, GRCC filed the Affidavit of James Tippets who

purported to have done water flow measurements of the raceway. (R. 189-195). Thayne
objected and filed a second Affidavit of Lee Thayn. (R. 200-202. The Court then denied
Thayn's Motion for Leave to File an Amended Counterclaim, (R. 242-244), holding that
U.C.A. § 73-1-7 is precluded in any situation where the parties have an existing contract in
place. No mention is made about Thayn's claim to have the raceway cleaned or expanded,
but said claim was denied by virtue of the denial of leave to file the Supplemental
Counterclaim, (id).
GRCC also moved to file a Supplemental Complaint, and then moved to file a second
Supplemental Complaint, (R. 263-311), which was stipulated to by defense counsel. (R. 254)
The Second Supplemental Complaint incorporated the prior four causes of action, and
added Trespass (fifth cause of action), punitive damages (Count six), a claim for injunction
against Thayn going onto GRCC property (Count seven), Declaratory Relief (Count eight),
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a claim for injunction that Thayne receive no water until GRCC has a full eighty cfs (with
no duty) during the irrigation season and 20 cfs all year (Count nine) and "Wrongful
diversion" (Count ten). (R. 263-311).
Thayne answered the Second Supplemental Complaint, denying most of the new
allegations, reincorporating its prior defenses and asserting that any failure of GRCC to
receive 80 cfs was due to its own failure to properly maintain the diversion works the
raceway, the dam and its own canal (R. 256-259).
The Court then entered its ruling on the Motion to Strike Affidavit and on Reciprocal
Motions for Summary Judgment. (R. 314-318).
Despite the fact that neither party requested partial summary judgment, the Court
entered what can only be deemed a "conditional" partial summaryjudgment. The Court held
there was disputed material issues of fact regarding latches, estoppel and waiver precluding
summary judgment, but then held that the 1952 amendment and agreement were
unambiguous, certain, definite and limit Thayn to 435 cfs for irrigation and to pump the
irrigation water. There is no opportunity to expand or enlarge Thayn's right, presumably
forever. The Court held that injunction was the proper remedy because there was only
nominal damages and that any damages actually suffered would be impossible to prove.
Finally the Court reiterated its position that U.C.A. § 73-1-7 was inapplicable where there
was an existing contract between the parties. These rulings were to take effect after trial on
the estoppel, waiver and latches issues.
At this juncture Reed Martineau, of Snow Christensen and Martineau, substituted in
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as counsel for John Waldo. Mr. Martineau moved to extend the discovery schedule and trial
date (R. 351), which was ultimately granted. (R. 451). GRCC then filed a Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment on its eighth and ninth causes of action seeking a permanent injunction
and declaratory relief that GRCC get its full eighty (80) cfs during the irrigation season and
20 cfs all year prior to Thayn receiving any water. (R. 359-405). Thayn opposed arguing
that GRCC only had a State water right to 60 cfs during the irrigation season and 20 cfs year
round, and that the 20 was inclusive in the sixty (60) during the irrigation season, (R. 461462), not cumulative. In response to GRCC's claim that Thayn was trespassing on GRCC
property for some repair work which caused two (2) trees (believed dead) to be removed,
Thayn argued he was only doing work made necessary by GRCC's repeated failure to do
demanded maintenance work on the raceway. (R. 454-460). Court granted Partial Summary
Judgment and struck from the record the Affidavit of Leon Thayn (which contained GRCC's
State approved water right document showing that GRCC only had a 60 cfs right, not an 80
cfs right), and entered an injunction against Thayn that GRCC receive 80 cfs during the
irrigation season and 20 cfs all year before Thayn receives any water. (R. 497-98).
Thereafter, Thayn applied for a Temporary Restraining Order due to the fact that GRCC
was attempting to construct a forty (40') foot wall extending out from its canal into the
raceway, adjacent to and in front of Thayn's pump house thereby impeding, if not blocking,
the flow of water to Thayn. (R. 524-539). TRO was granted, but subsequently dissolved
after evidentiary hearing on March 23, 1999 on the preliminary injunction, GRCC arguing
that Thayn could not prevail on the merits as he had no counterclaim pending regarding the
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wall1, and because Thayn's injury would be compensable by money damages. (R.621-626).
Thayn appealed by interlocutory appeal said denial of the Preliminary Injunction, which was
rejected by this Court, Case No. 990303, Order Denying Injunction Pending Appeal, dated
5/24/99.
Thayn then filed a Motion to Reconsider the Summary Judgment arguing that GRCC
only had a 60 cfs State approved water right, not 80 cfs (R. 571-593). Thayn also filed on
March 26, 1999 a Motion to Allow a Second Amended Counterclaim raising the lack of
maintenance by GRCC issues as a counterclaim, not merely an affirmative defense. (R. 594603).
The Court denied the Motion for Reconsideration citing that "there were no new
material facts or legal theories not considered by the Court at the time of the previous
ruling". (R. 873-874). The Court further denied the Motion to File a Second Amended
Counterclaim reasoning there was insufficient time for Plaintiff to do additional discovery
without changing the trial date. (R. 871-872).2
Thereafter, GRCC filed a Motion in Liming to limit Thayn's use of witnesses and
evidence at trial to Discovery responses already provided and not to allow an deviation from
responses to admissions already filed. (R.739-760). In particular, GRCC sought to preclude

!

The 40 foot wall was subsequently ordered removed by Federal Authorities and is not at
issue in this appeal. On remand, the District Court awarded attorney fees and costs which is
appealed herein.
2

The maintenance issues had already been raised as a defense. Presumably very little
discovery would be necessary.
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Thayn under a theory of unclean hands from denying he had somehow promised to share
revenue from the hydro plant with GRCC.3 The Court granted the Motion in Limine on the
discovery issues (R. 867-870)., and denied the motion to limit Thayn from being able to
argue estoppel at trial. (R. 909-911).
The Court directed trial proceed first on Thayn's defenses of estoppel, waiver and latches,
thence upon the remaining claims of GRCC for trespass (claiming certain improvements to
the pump house encroached upon the real property deeded GRCC under the 52 agreement
including the trash racks and the radial gates) and the claim for profits whereby GRCC
sought all past gross revenues of Thayn from the hydro electric plant. (R. 865). Trial was
held on May 18, 19, 20, 24, 25, 27, 28, June 17, 18 and 22.4
Subsequently, GRCC filed a Motion for Contempt contending they were not getting
their full 80cfs. A hearing was held on August 6,1999, at which hearing the Court heard the
testimony of Jack Barnett, expert witness for GRCC who attested that he took measurements
on the canal and raceway showing 532 cfs in the raceway and 692 cfs in the canal. (R. 1901,
P. 21). Accordingly, in his opinion, GRCC was not getting a full 80 cfs in the canal.
In Opposition to the Motion for Contempt, Thayn called David Hansen as his
expert who also took measurements in the raceway and the canal showing measurements

3

GRCC's position was that it never knew the hydro plant was under construction, yet at
the same time had oral promises from Leon to share the revenues.
4

A detailed discussion of the evidence at trial on the estoppel, latches and waiver issues is
contained in the argument section under issue VIII infra as Appellant was required to marshall
the evidence there.
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between 78 to 82 cfs. (id. at 137-138). He further attested that if the canal company would
remove three (3) feet of silt from the bottom of its canal, that would increase the flow
significantly, (id. at 145). In his opinion, there was adequate water in the raceway to meet
all of the 800 cfs needs, but that there was a restriction in the canal limiting the canal flows.
(id.) He opined that the two (2) major factors that needed to be fixed were cleaning the canal
and enlarging the inverted siphon inside the canal, (id.) At the conclusion of the testimony
on GRCC's Motion for Contempt, the Court ruled that, inasmuch as GRCC had no
measuring device, it had failed to meet its burden of proof on contempt with regard to how
much water was or was not flowing down its canal. (R. 1082-1087).
Thereafter, the parties filed their post trial memorandums and the Court entered its
Memorandum Decision Regarding Estoppel, Waiver and Latches on April 13, 2000. (R.
1395-1402). It also entered Memorandum Decisions regarding the issues of trespass (R.
1515-1517) and GRCC filed a Motion for Clarification and Reconsideration on the trespass
issue. (R. 1518-1533). After a number of objections and memorandums regarding the
rulings and/or proposed Findings of Fact, the Court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law Regarding Estoppel, Waiver and Latches and its Judgment on the First, Fourth,
Eighth and Ninth Causes of Action and on the Affirmative Defenses of Estoppel and Waiver
on March 14, 2001. (R. 1657-1673). This appeal, followed by a Notice of Appeal filed on
April 9, 2001. (R. 1714-1715).
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ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
I.

THE COURT ERRED IN INTERPRETING THE 52 AMENDMENT TO THE
52 CONTRACT BY GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT PRECLUDING
THAYN FROM USING ITS 600 CFS NON-CONSUMPTIVE STATE
APPROVED WATER RIGHT YEAR ROUND AND LIMITING HIM TO 435
CFS DURING THE IRRIGATION SEASON ONLY.
Interpretation of contracts is a question of law which is reviewed for correctness.

Levanger v Vincent, 3 p.3d 187 (Ut. 2000). The existence of an ambiguity in a contract is
a question of law. Munford v Lee Servicing Co., 999 P.2d 23 (Ut. App. 2000). The matter
was preserved for appeal by virtue of memorandums in opposition to the original motion for
summary judgment, (R. 151-153 a-v) and in opposition to the motion of GRCC for partial
summary judgment (R. 454-472).
The gist of both the original motion for summary judgment filed by GRCC, and its
motion for partial summary judgment was to preclude Thayn from utilizing his State
approved water right for 600 cfs all year round. GRCC sought, and successfully obtained,
orders restricting Thayn to 400 cfs power right and 35 cfs consumptive right during the
irrigation season only. The basis for said restriction was the 52 agreement and the 52
amendment. This Court reviews these decisions giving no deference to the rulings of the
trial court. Levanger v Vincent, supra. While the analysis begins by looking at the contract,
it does not end there. For example, in Peterson v Severe Valley Canal Company, 151 P.2d
477 (Ut. 1944) the Court was faced with interpreting a contract regarding the assessment of
maintenance costs between the Severe Valley Canal Company and the Paiute Reservoir and
Irrigation Company. The Court noted:
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From the recitals of the contract and the record and the course of conduct, it
is apparent that the parties intended the contract to apply only to Defendant's
main water canal, and that they were contemplating certain unusual expenses
in the operation and maintenance of such canal during the season. The costs
of operating said canal which are prorated by the provisions of paragraph 2,
do not include the costs of maintaining and operating the laterals leading
therefrom. To say that the italicized clause above set out prohibits any further
charges made against the Paiute company stockholders on a count of
maintenance of said laterals, would require the Defendant to flow Plaintiffs
water through its ditches without charge for the costs of maintaining and
operating those ditches. We conclude that the contract does not prohibit the
accessing of maintenance charges against Plaintiff for maintaining the laterals,
but that it applies to the main canal only. (id. 479).
The language of the contract specifically stated "that there shall be no further charges
against the Paiute Reservoir and Irrigation Company or its stockholders for turning out
water, for irrigation services, etc." The Peterson Court declined to apply a strict
interpretation of that clause, and instead applied a common sense approach taking into
consideration the parties course of conduct and common sense reasoning. Appellant Thayn
seeks nothing less herein.
In the present case, the original 52 agreement contains no merger clause. It does not
purport to be the entire contract of the parties, nor does it recite that all understandings and
agreements are incorporated therein. Rather, it is a resolution of an existing lawsuit by
which certain portions of the real property are transferred by and between the parties in
accordance with their respective needs and uses. It contains a paragraph dividing equally
the maintenance costs of the commonly utilized facilities and a covenant that each party shall
"keep the portion of said diverting works under its supervision in a state of reasonably good
repair and condition so that insofar as the diverting works situated on the lands described in
22

paragraphs 2 and 3 respective of this agreement are integral to or essential to the use,
operation and enjoyment of the other party that the same will be maintained and kept in
reasonably good repair and condition at all times". (R. 278). It is a contract that says what
they do agree to, it is not a contract precluding any further or other agreements or
understandings. The trial court focused on the 52 amendment ( of which Thayn had no
notice, nor could he reasonably be charged with notice), particularly paragraph 1 which
provides in full text as follows:
That the meaning of paragraph 6 of said original agreement was intended to
be that the first party should have a priority of diversion, and should be
entitled to take whatever water should be needed by said first party [GRCC]
or its stockholders before the second party [Wilson] should be entitled to
divert any water through or over the dam and diversion works; and that the
quantity of water needed should be exclusively determined by the said first
party. However it was and is mutually understood and agreed that the first
party claims for use of its stockholders 80 second feet of water as particularly
set forth in that diligence claim No. 46 on file and of record in the office of the
State Engineer of the State of Utah and that after said rights are satisfied
through diversion at said dam and diverting works that the water rights of the
second party as set forth in its water filing about to be issued by said State
Engineer for 35 cfs of water for irrigation uses upon approximately 1,325
acres of land, as well as its filing for power purposes to pump said water in not
to exceed 400 second feet or such lesser amount as may be approved by the
State Engineer of the State of Utah shall then be satisfied through diversions
at the dam and diverting works before any other or additional diversions are
made, by the first party.
It is apparent from a review of this contract that Wilsons water right filing had not yet
been determined and that same was still to be determined. Moreover, the quantity of water
allotted to the first party is limited to that water "needed". Although the contract provides
that the first party has the exclusive right to determine what it needs, that provision must be
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read in light of the duty of good faith and fair dealing imposed in all contracts. Malibu
Investment Company v Sparks, 996 p.2d 1043 (Ut. 2000) (as a general rule, every contract
is subject to an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, under which both parties to a
contract promise not to intentionally or purposefully do anything which will destroy or injure
the other parties right to receive the fruits of a contract). Thayn maintained below in its
motion for reconsideration, and on this appeal, that although GRCC claimed 80 cfs in its
application to the State Engineer's office, GRCC was only allotted 60 cfs, inclusive of its 20
cfs year round stock watering right. Thus, under the covenant of good faith, GRCC cannot
determine that it "needs" a greater water right than it is actually allotted by law. In fact, not
only is such a claim a violation of the duty of good faith, it goes to such an extreme point as
to be actually criminal conduct. U.C.A. § 73-3-3(9) provides:
Any person who changes or attempts to change a point of diversion place or
purpose of use, either permanently or temporarily, without first applying to the
State Engineer in the manner provided in this section: (a) obtains no right; and
(b) is guilty of a misdemeanor, each day of the unlawful change constituting
a separate offense separately punishable.
Further, U.C.A. § 76-10-202 mandates in relevant part:
Every person who, in violation of any right of any other person, willfully turns
or uses the water, or any part thereof, of any canal, ditch, pipeline or reservoir,
except at a time when the use of the water has been duly distributed to the
person^ or willfully uses any greater quantity of the water than has duly
distributed him, ...is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. [Emphasis added]
In the present case GRCC has been allotted by the State only 60 cfs during the
irrigation season as its maximum flow rate, and subject to an acre foot limitation. But what
GRCC has attempted (heretofore successfully) to do in this proceeding is to change both the
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maximum flow volume and the duty restrictions, to unlimited 80 cfs, prior to junior water
right holders such as Thayn. Of course, the State Engineer was not joined as a party to this
proceeding, not by mere omission Thayn asserts, but by deliberate intention. While Thayn's
counsel could be criticized for not having raised the 60 cfs issue at the original Motion for
Summary Judgment, which was denied subject to certain defenses, Thayn certainly did raise
the issue in the Motion for Reconsideration. Once the trial court was aware that the right of
GRCC was less than the right it asserted under the contract, the trial court was obligated not
to participate in a criminal conspiracy to thwart the water right statutes.
What is at issue here is not mere private property rights. The legislature has declared
that the use of water is a public use, stating "the use of water for beneficial purposes, as
provided in this title, is hereby declared to be a public use". U.C.A. 73-1-5. This is further
supported by a right of Eminent Domain granted to all persons of this state as follows:
Any person shall have a right of way across and upon public, private and
corporate lands, or other rights of way, for the construction, maintenance,
repair and use of all necessary reservoirs, dams, water gates, canals, ditches,
flumes, tunnels, pipelines and areas for setting up pumps and pumping
machinery or other means of securing, storing, replacing and conveying water
for domestic, culinary, industrial and irrigation purposes or for any necessary
public use, or for drainage, upon payment of just compensation therefor, but
such right of way shall in all cases be exercised in a manner not unnecessarily
to impair the practical use of any other right of way, highway or public or
private road, or to injure any public or private property. [Emphasis supplied].
Appellant Thayn maintains that the Court improperly interpreted the contract with a
strict interpretation, which is both nonsensical to the public use of water and not within the
intent of the parties as expressed therein. Moreover, the final ruling of the Court forces
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Thayn into a position of conspiring with GRCC to take more water than it is legally entitled
to or could reasonably utilize, before Thayn can receive even one drop of irrigation water.
No evidence of actual intent of the parties was presented at the trial Court inasmuch as the
actual signatories to the contract are long since deceased. However, Thayn attempted in his
affidavits and memorandums to get the court to consider the parties course of conduct, to
wit: the fact that Wilson, through dilapidated and inefficient equipment, had in fact obtained
a 600 non-consumptive water right use and had utilized said water for the irrigation season
to pump his 35 cfs consumptive use up to his 42 foot canal.
What Thayn did by modernization and technology was to take the same water right
use and make it efficient enough to pump the irrigation water with left over use for the
generation of hydroelectric power and recoupment of his costs of renovating the pump house
and the facilities. Such renovations included the renovation of the radial gates. This was a
benefit to both parties as it gave them more control over the raceway and an ability to easily
clean the raceway by means of sluicing. Thayn did, through his predecessor Wilson, apply
to the State Engineer to utilize the non-consumptive use year round, but nothing in the record
indicates there is any impediment to the wrater right of GRCC in the non-irrigation season
inasmuch as their water right is only 20 cfs (again subject to duty) for stock watering during
that time. The contract is, in fact, silent as to any additional water rights of Wilson or his
successors. Thayn urged, and the trial court rejected consideration of the parties course of
conduct in interpreting the contract. As stated in Willard Pease Oil and Gas Company v
Pioneer Oil and Gas Company, 899 p.2d 766 (Ut. 1995) if a contract is ambiguous and the
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The Supreme Court interprets contract terms in light of the reasonable expectation of
the parties, looking to the agreement as a whole and to the circumstances, and nature and
purpose of the contract. Pierce v Pierce, 994 P.2d 193 (Ut. 2000). It utterly inconceivable
that the parties intention and purpose of this contract was to violate the law or to otherwise
appropriate water in violation of the statutes of the State of Utah. Certainly there is nothing
in the contract itself from which such an intent could be gleaned.
When interpreting a contract, a Court must attempt to construe the contract so as to
harmonize and give effect to all of its provisions. Dixon vPro Image Inc., 987 P.2d 48 (Ut.
1999). Under the interpretation placed on the contract by Judge Bryner below, the word
"needed" becomes surplusage. There is no test applied to the word. The 80 cfs would define
what the parties were talking about and the word "needed" would irrelevant. Further, the
language, "to be exclusively determined by said first party", is also meaningless surplusage.
If the parties intended that GRCC would have the first 80 cfs and that Wilson Produce
Company would then have the next 435 cfs, they would have simply said that. There would
be no need to discuss priority of diversions and utilize such words as "needed" and "allotting
to GRCC" some right to make a determination as to what was needed. GRCC would simply
get the first 80. The interpretation placed upon the contract by the trial court below renders
portions of the contract meaningless.
The original signatories, unlike the trial court below, recognized the State Engineer
would be the final arbiter as to their water rights. If a contract is written and it is not
ambiguous, the parties intention is determined from the plain meaning of the contract. Dixon
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best ascertained by looking to the course of conduct of the parties, certainly the language
does not rise to the level of "plain and unmistakable". The interpretation placed upon this
contract by the trial court is not only unnecessary as a matter of law, it is contrary to law.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court should be reversed with respect to
the interpretation of the contract rendering the trial on the issues of estoppel, waiver and
latches moot. This Court should interpret the contract in accordance with common sense
meanings and the flexibility necessary to allow the evolution of more efficient water right
uses through the future. The contract should not be interpreted to discourage efficient uses
of water, but to encourage more efficient uses of water. This is precisely what Thayn did in
this case. His conduct should not only be condoned, it should be applauded. The conduct
of GRCC, in attempting to improperly extort the profits from another persons sweat and
labor in direct violation of the Utah water statutes is not only disingenuous, but intolerable.
II.

THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THAYN HAD A DUTY TO
DISCOVER THE "UNRECORDED" 52 AMENDMENT AND BINDING HIM
TO SAID AMENDMENT DESPITE THE FACT THAT NO NOTICE WAS
EVER PROVIDED TO HIM UNTIL AFTER THE HYDRO ELECTRIC
PLANT HAD BEEN BUILT.
At the conclusion of the trial, the Court specifically ruled in its memorandum

decision "the Plaintiffs silence complained of by the Defendant did not constitute a
relinquishment of the quantity and nature of the use limitations because the Plaintiff was
under no legal duty to inform the Defendant of the existence of the 1952 agreement and
amendment. The Court is persuaded that the Defendant bears the burden of discovering the
encumbrances and limitations on the property and water rights he purchases and that burden
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cannot be shifted to the Plaintiff. (R. 1395-1402, 96-97). In point of fact, Thayn never
signed the contract. Thayn admitted he was the successor in interest to Wilson but his
signature does not appear thereon. Contrary to the law applied by the court below, U.C.A.
§ 73-3-18, with respect to water rights, provides in relevant part that:
... prior to the issuance of a certificate of appropriation, rights claimed under
applications for the appropriation of water may be transferred by instruments
in writing. Such instruments, when acknowledged or proved and certified in
the manner provided by law for the acknowledgment or proving of
conveyances of real estate, may be filed in the office of the State Engineer,
and shall from the time of filing in said office impart notice to all person to the
contents thereof. Every assignment of an application which shall not be
recorded as herein provided shall be void as against any subsequent assignees
in good faith and for valuable consideration of the same application or any
portion thereof where his own assignment shall be first duly recorded.
If the Court rejects the interpretation under issue one (1) of this appeal, it necessarily
follows that the Court is interpreting that Wilson somehow assigned a portion of his water
rights to the benefit of GRCC. The burden would be upon the Plaintiff, GRCC, to show that
it imparted notice of that assignment to Thayn. This is contrary to the legal ruling of the
Court. As far as the Summary Judgment goes, it is elementary that at summary judgment
a moving party must show both that there are not issues of material fact and that it is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. U.R.C.P. Rule 56(c).
In the instant case there were, in fact, material issues of fact precluding summary
judgment, to-wit: the potential defenses of estoppel, waiver and latches. The Court,
however, fashioned a "conditional" summary judgment which ignored the disputed facts
and purported to grant summary judgment on the condition that Thayn did not succeed in
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one of his defenses. It is unlike the situation where one defense is ruled wholly inapplicable,
or one count on the complaint is ruled to be established as a matter of law. Here, virtually
all of the counts were subject to the potential defenses and Summary Judgment should not
have been granted.
More particularly, the Court erred as a matter of law in shifting the burden from the
Plaintiff to show that he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, to the Defendant to
show that the Plaintiff was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Since there is no
evidence in the record that the 52 amendment was ever recorded, how would Thayn ever
learn of the existence of such an amendment? There is no evidence it was filed with the
State Engineer's office. There is no evidence that it wasfiledin the County records (though
there is slight evidence that the 52 agreement itself may have been recorded). In McGarry
v Thompson, 114 Ut. 442, 201 P. 288 (1948) the Court held that an innocent purchaser for
value without notice of previous assignment, who first records his assignment, takes
preference over prior unrecorded assignments. As is noted in the facts section supra, the
assignment from Wilson Produce Company to Thayn were of record. The Court itself found
that Thayn did not have notice of the 52 amendment until August of 1992 (which is after the
hydro electric facility went online) (R. 1657-1668, 1659 Finding of Fact #15).
If, in fact, GRCC owed no duty to disclose the amendment to Thayn, same being
unrecorded and unregistered with the State Engineer's office, how would Thayn ever learn
of same? Similarly, the real estate recording statutes provide: U.C.A. § 57-3-103 provides:
"Each document not recorded as provided in this title is void as against any
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subsequent purchaser of the same real property, or any portion of it, if:
(1) the subsequent purchaser purchased the property in good faith and for
valuable consideration; and the subsequent purchaser's document is first duly
recorded."
Again, the duty is on he who wishes to assert an interest in land (or water rights) to
record or be subject to having his document declared void. In the instant case, GRCC has
not proved any recording with regard to the 52 amendment.
It is anticipated that GRCC could argue that it recorded the 52 agreement, and the 52
amendment is at least evidentiary value as to what the parties intended under paragraph 6 of
the original agreement. Even accepting that argument, if GRCC is allowed to introduce
extrinsic evidence as to the meaning of the agreement, i.e. the 52 amendment, should not
Thayn also be equally entitled to submit extrinsic evidence as to the meaning of the 52
agreement, to-wit: the parties course of conduct? Thayn contends that the Court misapplied
the burdens of proof and imposed upon him an impossible duty to search the world over for
an undisclosed, unrecorded, and secreted agreement held only in the hidden files of GRCC
until after he had expended some $300,000 to renovate and remodel the pump house. Equity
demands much more of GRCC than this. The Court should reverse the judgment of the trial
court andfindthat the 52 amendment in unenforceable as against Thayn. Alternatively, the
Court should remand the matter to the trial court for redetermination of the interpretation of
the contract considering aU extrinsic evidence, including the 52 amendment, as well as the
parties course of conduct in dealing with each other.
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U.C.A. § 73-3-5, 8, and subject to judicial review of his actions. U.C.A. § 73-3-14. Water
users must file proof of their appropriation for a beneficial use, or in areas where a general
adjudication has occurred or is pending (such as here) may elect to file a statement of claim
for determination by the State as to the nature and amount of beneficial use. U.C.A. § 73-316).
Thereafter, the successful user receives a certificate of appropriation, in quantity of
flow and/or acre-feet (depending on the use) which is prima facie evidence of the water
rights. U.C.A. All users are required to construct and install measuring devises to measure
the use of their water. U.C.A. § 73-5-4.5
There is no right of adverse possession to water, U.C.A. §73-3-1 and priorities of use
are determined by the date of first use, except that in times of scarcity when the better use
has priority. (U.C.A. § 73-3-21.
Failure to utilize water for a five year period causes loss of the right. U.C.A. §73-1 -4.
It was argued below by GRCC (successfully) that the 52 Agreement and Amendment must
be enforced and an injunction must issue because GRCC had a "constitutional right to
exclude others" from the use of their facilities. (R. 1899, p. 89); See also oral arguments at
Summary Judgment 1905). No authority was ever cited for this premise!
Thayn maintains, based upon the foregoing, that the interpretation placed upon the
contract in this case, coupled with denial of his statutory right of eminent domain, violates
public policy and that the remedy of injunction should not have been imposed.
5

GRCC has no measuring devises on its canal or the raceway. (R. 1899).
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First, the lower Court has granted to GRCC a right of use in its canal 80 cfs (without
duty) and with priority over Thayn's established beneficial uses, over and above that to
which the no State authorized. This violates both the "need" provision of the contract and
the overwhelming policy against water waste in this State.
Secondly, without any showing whatsoever of beneficial use by GRCC, Thayn's clear
and unequivocal beneficial use of generating electricity is curtailed, and lost. This is
egregiously apparent in the offseason (non-irrigation season) during which GRCC has only
a 20 cfs stock maximum flow watering right and there is no dispute in the record that Thayn
could utilize water to generate electricity at such times without even a question of
impairment to GRCC.
Nevertheless, the order of the trial court below prohibits same. Why does the Court
below allow the water to flow out of State and be appropriated for use by junior water right
holders in another State? What possible benefit is that to the citizens of this state?
The reason, of course, is that GRCC desires to extort from Thayn not the measure of
any damages to it, as there are no such provable damages, but the profits of Thayn's hard
work, ingenuity, industriousness and capital investment.
Third, the trial court below, although it expressly stated it was not adjudicating water
rights, in fact did! The judgment of the Court states "The Canal Company has the right to
use thefirst80 cfs diverted through the canal diversion facilities during the irrigation season
and the first 20 cfs during the non-irrigation season." (R. 1670, % 3).
The Court went on to enforce the mystical "right to exclude" claimed by GRCC to
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exclude Thayn from any hydro- electric power sale whatsoever without the express consent
of GRCC. {Id at para. 5.)
This was done without joining the State Engineer as a defendant as provided for in
U.C.A. § 73-3-14. In essence GRCC has obtained a water right through the back door for
80 cfs that it never could lawfully obtain from the State Engineer.
Fourth, that to the extent GRCC has obtained a priority of 80 cfs over and above
Thayn, and over and above GRCC's State approved water right the Judgment violates the
public policy against waste, and is beyond the jurisdiction of the trial court to grant without
joining the State Engineer as a party.6
Finally, Thayn attacks the preliminary injunction as a remedy. An injunction cannot
be used to violate criminal statues. Literally, unless Thayn cooperates in GRCC's taking
water illegally, Thayn doesn't even get his irrigation water. Until GRCC gets 20 cfs of water
over and above its State approved water right, in violation of law, (a misdemeanor for every
day of the offense), Thayn gets not one drop of water. Moreover, without any duty
limitation by the court, GRCC is granted unfettered and unlimited acre foot priority over
Thayn.
Additionally, GRCC argued below that Thayn promised to share in the profits, "as
agreed previously " if the hydro-electric plant was constructed. (R.E. 98, minutes of 1/7/92).
The only agreement which the parties could have been talking about was the National Hydro

6

This argument was not raised below because the Court assured the parties it was not
adjudicating water rights, then did.
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contract under which GRCC would be entitled to one percent of the gross revenues over and
above the first 863,500 KWH (i.e. the irrigation pumping needs of Thayn). Accordingly,
GRCC had an adequate remedy at law, i.e. suit on that oral promise. GRCC chose not to
pursue that, but rather pursued some undefined claim for gross revenues. A party cannot
simply ignore its contract remedy for damages as a basis to say it has no adequate remedy
at law.
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court should be reversed as void against public
policy. Alternatively, the matter should be reversed and rewarded to ascertain the damages
against Thayn under the "oral promise to share revenues as previously agreed" and the
injunctive relief denied.
IV.

THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THAYN FROM HIS STATUTORY
RIGHTS UNDER U.C.A. § 73-1-6 AND 7 INSOFAR AS BOTH VOLUME AND
POWER GENERATION FOR SALE IS CONCERNED.
The Court below held Thayn was not entitled to utilize eminant domain inasmuch os

the agreements were enforceable. U.C.A. § 73-1-7 entitled "Enlargement for Joint Use of
Ditch" provides as follows:
When any person desires to convey water for irrigation or any other beneficial
purpose and there is a canal or ditch already constructed that can be used or
enlarged to convey the required quantity of water, such person shall have the
right to use or enlarge such canal or ditch already constructed, by
compensating the owner of the canal or ditch to be used or enlarged for the
damage caused by such use or enlargement and by paying an equitable
proportion of the maintenance of the canal or ditch jointly used or enlarged;
provided that such enlargement shall be made between the first day of October
and the first day of March, or at any other time may be agreed upon with the
owner of such canal or ditch. The additional water turned in shall bear its
proportion of loss by evaporation and seepage. [Emphasis added]
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Further, U.C.A. § 73-1-6 provides a right-a-way across public, private and corporate
lands for the construction, maintenance and repair of any such facilities including for
industrial and irrigation purposes. The trial court in this case not only prohibited Thayn from
its eminent domain rights as provided by statute, but also entered an order against him
prohibiting him from having his right of way access to maintain or repair the raceway even
in the absence of GRCC's unwillingness to do so. (R. 497-498). Again, the argument of
GRCC was it's nebulous "right to exclude". Further, GRCC maintained that because there
was an agreement with Wilson that Thayn had no statutory right of eminent domain.
Thayn contends this is error in two (2) points. First, the case law cited by GRCC is
case law under U.C.A. § 73-1-9 which addresses the issue of how maintenance costs should
be apportioned. Case law under that statute holds that where there is an express agreement
between the parties U.C.A. § 73-1-9 is inapplicable. See, e.q. Gunnison-Fayett Canal Co.
v Roberts, supra (and cases cited therein in footnote 1 p. 105). Based upon that line of
reasoning, the Court held there was no right of eminent domain applicable to Thayn. (R.
242-244). In Peterson v Severe Valley Canal Company, 107 Ut. 45, 151 P.2d 477 (1944)
the Court held as follows:
If the parties can agree on the joint use of the ditch, condemnation is not
necessary. In that event, if the parties agree on the amount to be paid for the
use, or the basis for determination of the amount, the contract controls. If,
however, the parties cannot agree on the price to be paid for the use, the ditch
owner can close the ditch against the other parties water until he gets his price,
but the party who desires to use may exercise the right of eminent domain to
acquire such use.
Whatever this court interprets the agreement to have been in 1952 between GRCC
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and Wilson, and even if this Court interprets that contract is binding on Thayn as successor
in interest, nevertheless, a new use has come upon the scene. A use of hydroelectric power
by means of modern technology and efficiency in the pumping of the irrigation water. That
use extends not just for the irrigation season, but for the entire year. As to the new use, the
parties have not agreed. This lawsuit is abundant evidence of that. The injunction and
restraining order that the Plaintiff sought shows the parties don't agree. The water right for
600 cfs non-consumptive all year round which was approved by the State Engineer is not the
water right specified under the 52 or amendment. The new use carries with it a right of
eminent domain. The Court was in error to deny a right of eminent domain for the new use.
In its equitable powers, the Court may well have found that the old formula for costs and
maintenance, i.e. 50% to each party, was no longer equitable. The Court may well have
imposed a pro rata share of the costs and maintenance upon Thayn, by reason of the alleged
use to which Thayn sought to employ.
To hold, as did the trial court in this case, that a contract for one use forever and ever
precludes any future uses, enlarged uses, or changed uses is to narrow the scope of §7 3-1-7
beyond the intent of the plain meaning of the statute. In fact, the statute specifically
anticipates "additional water". As to the "additional water" here, there is no agreement and
Thayn should have its statutory right of eminent domain. A review of the cases cited by
GRCC below shows that the Court therein was attempting to resolve issues wherein the
contribution as to ditch maintenance had already been agreed upon, but one or more parties
to the contract sought to impose the pro rata formula as opposed to the agreement. Such is
40

not the case here.
Thayn has a beneficial use for the generation of hydro electricity which was never
anticipated under the 52 ammendment. It is true that Thayn's predecessor was using power
to pump water but same was mechanical power, not hydro electric power. By use of modern
and efficient means, Thayn's power needs to pump water have been reduced and excess
water energy can be utilized for hydro electric purposes. As to this use, there was no
agreement and U.C.A. § 73-1-7 controls.
In interpreting the statute, the Supreme Court should ask itself did the legislature
intend for parties who have an existing contract, to be forever precluded from the benefits
of modernization and new technology? For example, assume parties have a joint ditch
sharing agreement in place. For 60 years water has meandered through an earthen ditch with
seepage and evaporation losses to both parties. One party now seeks to enlarge the ditch to
accommodate a pipeline to prevent seepage and loss of water for his irrigation water and
allow same to be pumped at higher pressure, more regulated volume, and greater efficiency.
Under the interpretation placed upon the statute by Judge Bryner below, that party can never
do so because there is in place an existing agreement as to how they will share the ditch. Just
because parties in the early 1900s entered into agreements and contracts of accommodation
with each other to utilize water according to the technology of their day, should modern day
successors in interest be forever barred from renovating and industrializing? Should they
be trapped in the obsolete technology of third world countries forever? Was that the
legislative intent?
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Thayn propounds it was not. Rather the statute should be interpreted in terms of
common sense reasoning and flexibility to encourage, not prohibit, modernization. This is
especially true with respect to something as scarce as water. The more efficiently it is used,
the more water there is for everyone. Remember, this is public water, not private water.
The State is the steward over that water and any private party's rights to utilize same is
conditional. As a matter of good public policy, the Supreme Court should hold that eminent
domain lies whenever a new or expanded use of the water, or even a more efficient
technological use of the water, is proposed by one party to the contract and the other party
to the contract will not agree. Anything less forever imprisons parties whose predecessors
in interest may have amicably resolved their joint ditch or canal sharing in the past, and
relegates them to only obsolete technology forever and ever7. The Supreme Court should
reverse the ruling of the trial court and remand the matter for proceedings under the eminent
domain statutes. Upon such remand the Court should instruct the trial court as to how to
apportion the maintenance costs and for a determination of damages, if any, by the hydro
electric use of Thayn.
V.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ASSESSING ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR
DENIAL OF THE MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION WHEREIN
GRCC WAS BUILDING AN OBSTRUCTION WALL TO IMPEDE THAYN'S
WATER IN THE CANAL DURING THE COURSE OF THIS ACTION,
WHICH CONDUCT WAS IN BLATANT VIOLATION OF U.C.A. § 73-1-15.

7

Ironically, while GRCC herein argued there can be no enlargment of future uses by
Thayn, the 52 agreement itself specifically anticipated increased future use under the cost
sharing provisions.
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U.C.A. § 73-1-15 provides in relevant part:
Whenever any person, partnership, company or corporation has a right of way
of any established type or title for any canal or other water course it shall be
unlawful for any person, persons or governmental agencies to place or
maintain in place any obstruction, or change of the water flow by fence or
otherwise, along or across or in such canal or watercourse.... That the vested
rights in established canals and watercourses shall be protected against all
encroachments...Any person, partnership, company or corporation violating
the provisions of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and is subject to
damages and costs.
When GRCC began building the 40 foot wall extending out from its canal into the
raceway and blocking the water flow to Thayn's pump house, Thayn applied for and
received a temporary restraining order on March 15, 1999, (R. 540-542). Thereafter a
hearing was held on the Motion for Preliminary Injunction, which injunction was denied due
to the failure to have an underlying claim in the Thayn's pleadings and because the Court
ruled there was no irreparable injury, money damages could be awarded. (R. 621-627).
Thereafter the Court awarded attorney's fees of $7,518.50 and no costs for GRCC's
resistance of the preliminary injunction, and $1,614.00 and $734.00 in costs on appeal for
resisting the application of Thayn for preliminary injunction on appeal on November 27,
2000. (R. 1624-1625).
The conduct of GRCC in attempting to obstruct water flow to Thayn was clearly
culpable and in violation of law under the above set forth statute. Nevertheless, no
preliminary injunction was issued. U.R.C.P. Rule 65A(c)(2) provides:
The amount of security shall not or establish or limit the amount of costs,
including reasonable attorney's fees incurred in connection with the
restraining order or preliminary injunction, or damages that may be awarded
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to a party who is found to have been wrongfully restrained or enjoined.
In the present case, the attorney's fees were all expended in resisting an application
for preliminary injunction, and not for wrongful injunction.

(See Affidavit of David

Hartvigsen In Support of Application for Attorney's Fees, (R. 733). Although a temporary
restraining order was issued, no motion to dissolve the temporary restraining order was made
as is provided for under U.R.C.P. 65A(b)(4) and it lapsed of its own accord. Rather the
efforts of GRCC were fully devoted to resisting issuance of a preliminary injunction, which
efforts were successful. In Mountain States Tel & Tel Co., vAtkin, Wright & Miles, Chtd.,
681 P.2d 1258 (Ut. 1984) the Utah Supreme Court has held that "if it's found that the
injunction was wrongfully issued, the enjoined party has an action for costs and damages as
a result of the wrongfully issued injunction", (id 1262). Moreover, in Tholen v Sandy City,
849 P.2d 592 (Ut. App. 1993), Tholen Court held that wrongfully enjoined parties "are only
entitled to fees...incurred in defending against wrongfully obtained injunctive relief, and not
to fees incurred in litigation in the underlying lawsuit associated with the injunction", (id
597). In the present case, no injunction was issued and the attorney's fees, both at the trial
court level and at the Supreme Court level, were incurred in attempting to obtain an
injunction and not in wrongfully enjoining a party. While attorney's fees directly related to
the dissolution of a wrongful injunction are recoverable, Artistic Hairdressers Inc. v Levy,
486 P.2d 482,484 (Nev. 1971 )(cited with approval in Saunders v Sharp, 793 P.2d 927 Utah
App. 1990), there is no Utah appellate case of record showing that one successfully resisting
the issuance of an injunction is entitled to his attorney's fees. While the policy and purpose
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of Rule 65A may well be to uup the ante" for those obtaining a restraining order or an
injunction, neither the Rule nor the case law provide for attorney fees in those situations
where an injunction is not obtained. It is elementary that Utah follows the American rule
with regard to attorney's fees, and attorney's fees are not awarded unless provided for in the
contract or by statute. While Rule 65A(c)(2) does refer to attorney's fees "in connection
with" a restraining order or preliminary injunction, said fees may only be awarded, "to a
party who is found to have been wrongfully restrained or enjoined". All of the attorney's
fees and costs incurred and awarded to GRCC were attorney's fees expended in resisting a
preliminary injunction. They were not so enjoined. Accordingly, the award of attorney's
fees and costs should be reversed. The order of the Court below awarding attorney fees to
GRCC adds insult to injury where, as here, the conduct sought to be enjoined is itself a
criminal action.
VI.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPLYING THE STANDARDS OF
ESTOPPEL, WAIVER AND LATCHES AND IN CONCLUDING THAT
GRCC HAD NO DUTY TO PROTEST THAYN'S WATER FILING IF GRCC
INTENDED TO RELY ON ITS INTERPRETATION OF THE 52
AMENDMENT.
a: Burden of Proof
Thayn maintains that the Court erred below in applying a clear and convincing

evidence standard under estoppel. This is a question of first impression to the Supreme
Court. GRCC argued below that a majority of courts have applied a clear and convincing
evidence standard to estoppel. A review of the cases cited by GRCC does not show that a
majority of the jurisdictions have so ruled. While there are a number of courts that do in fact
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apply the clear and convincing evidence standard to estoppel, Utah has never so ruled.
When faced with the issue on waiver, the Court in Soter's Inc. v Desert Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n, 857 P.2d 935 declined to impose a clear and convincing evidence standard on the
issue of waiver. Thayn maintains as a matter of law there is no just reason for imposing a
higher burden of proof on estoppel than any other equitable defense, or equitable action.
What policy is served by affording an equitable right, such as an injunction by a
preponderance of the evidence, and then imposing on an equitable defense, such as estoppel,
a higher burden of proof? It is true that fraud has historically required clear and convincing
evidence due to the nature of the action requiring a misrepresentation. Estoppel, on the other
hand, is only a defense and is imparted in those actions where, in justified reliance on a
party's word, conduct or inaction, a person changes his position to his detriment. Estoppel
is there to prevent a wrongdoer from obtaining an unjust benefit by virtue of his own
conduct. It is not similar to fraud where one seek to recover damages or undo a transaction
already complete. This Court should hold the burden of proof is preponderance of the
evidence standard and not the clear and convincing evidence standard.
(b) The trial court's conclusions are non-sequitur to its findings. In its findings of fact
and conclusions of law the Court held that the standard of proof in an estoppel case is clear
and convincing evidence (R. 1665 \ 23). The Court further held that "because Mr. Thayn
did not inform an intent to proceed with the commercial hydro electric project until July of
1990, the conduct of the parties prior to that date is irrelevant to the issue of estoppel", {id.
\ 24). Such conclusion is non-sequitur from the findings. It is precisely because the canal
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company did not protest the water filing of Wilson, under which the State Engineer
determined Wilson was utilizing 600 cfs and not the previously applied for 400 cfs and the
subsequent water filing in 1981 by Wilson to change the 600 cfs approved water right to a
year round water right that induced Thayn to even consider the possibility of hydro electric
generation. Unquestionably, by the time of the National Hydro project, the issue of Thayn
and Wilson's prior claimed use of the water had been brought to the forefront of the canal
company. The water rights already established were part and parcel of the contract regarding
the proposed National Hydro project i.e. the pumping needs of Thayn to which the National
Hydro contract purported to exclude any royalty payment for. The canal companies utter
silence and non-protest of the water rights would induce any reasonable person to believe
that there was no issue with regard to the 600 cfs. Mr. Thayn would not proceed to invest
$300,000 into a hydro electric plant if there were an issue as to his use of the 600 cfs. For
the Court to rule that any conduct prior to Thayn's forming an intent to invest the money into
the hydro electric plant was irrelevant is simply absurd and illogical. Parties do not make
a decision in a vacuum. It was the perfected water rights upon which Thayn believed there
was no issue and no question that he sought to make use of.
Moreover, the Court ruled that Mr. Thayn's pre-1992 actual water use did not impart
any notice to the canal company that Thayn intended to divert more than 435 cfs through the
raceway in contravention of the 1952 agreements. (R. 1666 ^f 30). In actual fact, it is the
canal company's egregious violation of 73-5-4 by not installing any measuring devices
which, even if you take the facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, results in its lack
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of knowledge of the amount of water being used. However, as of the publication of notice
to water users in 1982 (R. 53), the canal company is charged with notice by virtue of the
posting of the water right application. Said notice specifies that the 600 second feet of water
would be diverted as set forth in the application through the raceway. Ten (10) years follow
and still no objection to Thayn regarding utilizing 600 cfs in the raceway. These conclusions
are error as a matter of law. They simply do not follow from the facts as found by the Court.
In paragraph 28 of its conclusions, the Court finds that the minutes of the canal
company do not evidence any awareness by the canal company that Thayn intended to use
the 600 cfs for commercial power generation. First, how he used the cfs was really none of
the canal companies business. It is the quantity, not the particular use, to which the canal
company may have any objection. Whether he intends to use his water for irrigation
pumping or commercial power generation is irrelevant, or should be, to the canal company.
Of course, if the canal companies real motivations are to attempt to extort profits from a joint
ditch user, they might well be concerned as to how valuable the use of the water is. If the
canal company is simply concerned about receiving its own water, their only concern should
be the amount of water flowing through the diversion facilities. It doesn't take a rocket
scientist to know what the true motivations of the canal company are in this case.
For example, the testimony of David Hansen, Thayn's expert witness at the contempt
hearing (R. 1901, pp. 145-146), was that there was plenty of water to satisfy all of the parties
needs and that the raceway could accommodate the entire 800 cfs without problem. Hansen
further noted that there was between 5 and 10 cfs flow being lost through the upper sluice
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gates which the canal company had not fixed (R. 1901, pp. 148-150). His testimony was that
there was three (3) feet of silt in the bottom of GRCC's canal and an inverted siphon which
were restricting its own flow. This is failure of the canal company to maintain its own ditch
utilized as an excuse to attempt to extort profits from Thayn.
The Court further found that Mr. Thayn first learned of the 52 amendment in 1992,
(after the hydro electric plant was online) when being questioned by the canal company
about his commercial hydro electric plant. (R. 1660 ^ 15).
The Court also concluded that the 1981 newspaper article in the Sun Advocate about
the hydro electric project was too vague and general in nature to give any notice of any intent
to build the present hydroelectric project.
These conclusions simply do not follow from the facts. There is no question that the
canal company members, including board members were well aware of, (or are charged with
notice by virtue of the water right filing) that Thayn was utilizing 600 cfs. Allowing, even
in the best light, 15 years of utter silence, by the canal company and then imposing a duty
upon Thayn to discover an unrecorded 52 amendment to the contract which apparently the
canal company had in its records and, for no reason whatsoever, never disclosed or discussed
with Thayn as a basis to now preclude him is unquestionably aprima facia case of estoppel.
See and compare Ceco Corp. v Concrete Specialties Inc. 772 P.2d 967, 969-970 (Ut. 1989)
also Utah State Building Comm 'n v Great American Indemnity Company, 105 Ut. 11, 140
P.2d 762, 771-72 (1943) (inaction or silence may amount to an estoppel where a party
remains silent when there is a legal or moral duty to speak or where there is "something
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wilful or culpable in the silence which allows another to place himself in an unfavorable
position by the reason thereof.
At a minimum, the elements of waiver and latches were established, even if you
accept the factual findings of the trial court as valid. Becks tead v Deseret Roofing Co. Inc.,
831 P.2d 130 (Ut. App. 1992) "waiver is the voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a
known right and the failure to adhere to the precise terms of a contract, combined with the
absence of notice of a party's intention to insist on strict compliance, is enough evidence to
support a finding of waiver". Airoulofski v State 1992 P.2d 889 (Ala. 1996)"implied waiver
occurs when the neglect to insist on a right is such that it would convey a message to a
reasonable person that the neglectful party would not in the future pursue the legal right in
question". Doit Inc. v Touche Ross & Co., 926 P.2d 835 (Ut. 1996) "latches is present when
a Plaintiff seeking equity unreasonably delays in bringing an action and this delay prejudices
the Defendant". Latches is an equitable doctrine based on the maxim that equity aids the
vigilante, not those who slumber on their rights. Nilson-Newey & Co. v Utah Resources
Int'l, 905P.2d312.
VIL

THE COURT ERRED GRANTING GRCC'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN PRECLUDING EVIDENCE AT TRIAL
REGARDING MAINTENANCE ISSUES, WHILE ALLOWING GRCC TO
ATTEST IT WAS NOT GETTING ITS WATER.
The Court at trial ruled that because the issue of lack of maintenance was not raised

as an affirmative defense prior to the original Summary Judgment ruling, it could not now
be raised at trial. (R. 81-85.) Defense Counsel argued both that it was an additional element
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of the estoppel theory and direct rebuttal to their claim that Thayn was preventing GRCC
from getting its full 80 cfs. (R. 84.) The Court nevertheless denied admission of the
evidence as irrelevant to the issue of estoppel. (R. 86.)
However, GRCC was allowed to put on evidence it was not getting its full 80 cfs,
(Vetere testimony, R. 1902 v. I, p.220). GRCC's Second Supplemental Complaint alleges
it should have declaratory relief because commencing in 1996 GRCC became aware it was
not receiving its full 80 cfs of water and Thayn refused to turn off his turbines. (R. 271,
para. 42-43.) This was denied by Thayn in Answer and specifically raised GRCC's failure
to maintain the raceway and diversion facilities. (R. 258,^} 15.) It was further raised by Lee
Thayn in his Affidavit in Opposition to GRCC's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on
its eighth and ninth courses of action. Thayn attested that:
They have wholly failed to properly maintain the dam and diversion
works as required by the 1952 agreement so that the rate of flow to sustain the
needs of both the Plaintiff and the Defendant could be satisfied. Specifically,
they have refused despite my repeated requests, to close the gates on the West
end of the dam to permit an increase of flow into the raceway. In fact, they
have locked them open. . . . More importantly, they have refused, in spite of
my urgent requests to clean out the raceway, so more water could reach the
power house and the head of Plaintiff s canal. In fact, they have refused my
repeated requests that I be permitted to clean out the raceway at my own
considerable expense. (R. 465.)
Thayn's position on this issue is simple. Either the trial court erred in granting the
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment over the issue of whether GRCC was properly
maintaining the facilities, or it erred in not admitting the maintenance issues at trial.
If the Court considered the question of maintenance to be part and parcel of the
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estoppel, waiver and latches issues, then the partial summary judgment was proper. In ruling
on a Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court may consider only facts that are not in
dispute, Sorenson v Beers, 585 P.2d 458 (Ut. App. 1978.) Accordingly, Thayn was entitled
to proceed with the maintenance issues at trial and it was an abuse of discretion to exclude
such testimony.
If the Court in fact believed the maintenance issues had no relevancy to the estoppel,
waiver and latches theory, the ruling at trial may be upheld, but the summary judgment was
improper.
GRCC cannot have its cake and eat it, too. Thayn was entitled, somewhere, to have
his day in Court on the maintenance issues.
The Court should reverse and remand for new trial either on the error of granting
partial summary judgment or for excluding evidence of failure to maintain the facilities from
the trial.
VIII. THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING FINDINGS OF FACT AGAINST THE CLEAR
AND UNDISPUTABLE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
The trial court found that the canal company did not intend to relinquish either the quantity
of nature of use limitations of the 1952 agreements and that it did not make a distinct relinquishment
of the quantity or nature of use limitations. (R. 1661fflj21-22). The trial court further found the
canal company did not know, nor should have known, that Mr. Thayn was unaware of the 52
agreements prior to August of 1992. (R. 1621 ^ 23). The trial court further found that Mr. Thayn
did not suffer any injury as a lack of diligence on the canal company. (R. id. at ^ 25). The trial court
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further found that, although some of the canal company's board members knew that Mr. Thayn was
renovating his facilities and the generators were being delivered to the pump house, they were not
aware he was going to generate power for sale until spring of 1992 when Thayn began generating
commercial power and using more water. (R. 1662, ^f 27).
Finally, the trial court found that neither Mr. Thayn nor anyone else informed the canal
company prior to April of 1992 that Mr. Thayn was going to generate commercial power as a part
of the pump house facilities renovation and upgrade project, {id. at f 28). Thayn maintains that
these conclusions are not supported by the evidence as a matter of law and are clearly erroneous.
In marshaling the evidence, the evidence at trial discloses the following:
At trial Thayn first called Clinton Thompson, GRCC 's ditch rider from 1987 to 1989,
who testified he observed the construction occurring at the pump house and knew Thayn was
putting in electrical generating facilities. (R. 1902, V.I. p. 31). He further testified he had
a conversation with Jack Erwin about the raceway that it needed to be cleaned out and
growth of shrubs cut back (R. 1902, V. I., p. 34-35). He further noted the dam needed repair.
(R. 1902, V. I., p. 35).
Dean King, GRCC board member for 18 years until 1988, attested he wasn't sure if
he knew about Wilson', 1974 application for a 600 cfs water right. (R. 1902, V.I., p.45) but
did know Wilson was diverting water year round since 1981. (R. 1902 V.I., p. 45). King
attested that he, Tim Vetere, Jack Erwin, Blaine Silliman and Bill Cache were the members
of GRCC who negotiated on the National Hydro contract. (R. 1902, V.I., p. 47). The
National Hydro contract was to pay GRCC 1% of the gross revenues for 15 years and 2%
thereafter, except the first 863,500 KWH representing Thayn's pumping needs, {id. at 49).
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King was aware GRCC did not protest Wilson's application for 600 cfs in 1974. Further that
he didn't have a problem with Wilson"s application to increase from 400 to 600 cfs because
it was Wilson, Not Thayns. (R. id. at 52). He did it for Wilson because he was one of the
"good ole boys", (id.). GRCC didn't have a problem with Wilson having 600 cfs
or they would have objected, (id. 55).
King acknowledged he knew from the size of the pump house renovation that it
would be used to generate electricity. (R. 1902 V.I., p. 96). King specifically acknowledged
Thayn's requesting GRCC clean its canal and the raceway and that GRCC never did it. (R.
1902, V.L, p. 12). King further acknowledged Thayn addressing the 600 cfs nonconsumptive going through the pump house back to the river, (id. 12).
Thayn presented Kenneth Stillman, Mayor of Green River City and GRCC board
member beginning in 1989. He was also vice-president of GRCC from 1991-1993. (R.
1902, V.L. p. 127). He had originally protested Wilson's 1981 600 cfs change filing on
behalf of the city, but later withdrew that protest, (id. at 130). GRCC did not protest that
filing, (id.) Further, GRCC had no measuring devices on its property, (id. at 131).8
Stillman was aware Thayn intended to generate power for sale on a commercial basis
(id. at 132), that Wilson's old pumping equipment was in disrepair and wasting water, (id.
at 134), and that the sluice gates were in "tough shape", (id. at 136). The raceway had
branches and stuff hanging into it. (id.). Stillman specifically recalled a 3/14/89 GRCC
board meeting discussion of Thayn's proposed hydroelectric plant being discusses, (id. at
8

Mcasuring devices are required by U.C.A. § 73-5-4.
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139). Stillman said that Leon Thayn represented that if power was generated, GRCC would
receive a royalty, (id. at 141).
Olive Anderson, Green River City Councilwoman and GRCC shareholder attested
she knew of Thayn's intent to sell power to U. P. & L, that the city wanted to buy direct, and
that it was talked about around town. (R. 1902, V.I., 155-158).
Bernard Lassen, GRCC shareholder, knew of Thayn's plans to sell power, he had no
water problems, and attested that anyone who drove up the road by the pump house could
see the transformers sitting outside the pump house prior to their installation in 1990. (R.
1902,V.I.,p. 162-171).
Odell Anderson, local resident, attested it was common knowledge Thayn was going
to pump water and generate el4ectricity before, during and after the project was being built.
(R. 1902, V.I.,pp. 182-193). This was confirmed by Robert Seely, GRCC shareholder, (id.
200-203).
Tim Vetere, current board member, was called. Vetere was elected to GRCC's board
in 1991 and claimed that since 1992 there had been numerous problems getting water, that
the amount of the water would fluctuate. (R. id. at 220). Vetere acknowledged that he had
gone to the pump house in 1989 and talked with Leon Thayn who told him they were putting
generators in to generate power, (id. at 223). Vetere was vice-president of GRCC at that
time and was aware Thayn was going to sell power, (id. at 224). His understanding was that
there was an agreement with the canal company regarding the generation of power for sale.
(id. at 228).
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Leon Thayn was called and testified that he was originally a partner with Lee when
they bought the Wilson farm. (R. 1902, V.2, p. 11). He and Lee obtained copies of the
water filings and verified the water rights prior to purchase, {id. at 12-13). The records were
very clear and documented as 600 cfs non-consumptive use for power and 35 cfs
consumptive use for irrigation, {id. p. 15). They relied on the water right in order to
purchase the property, {id. at 16). The condition of the equipment was very poor. {id. at 1619). The pumping equipment was in such disrepair that they had to run both turbines of
water continuously during the irrigation season in order to pump water, {id. at 33). He and
Lee determined it would have to be rebuilt {id. at 39-40).
Leon was contacted by National Hydro who recommended it as a site for power
generation and was working with the canal company at the time. {id. at 49). He became
aware of the 52 agreement when he saw the application presented to the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission by National Hydro, {id. at 50). He first learned of the 52
amendment in a meeting with GRCC in 1992. {id.). They signed an agreement with U. P.
& L. in late 1990 or early 1991 and began delivering power on April 2, 1992. {id. at 51).
They took out a loan to finance the project with a credit limit of $250,000, Thayn ranch and
Rick Kaster both signed on the loan, with the equipment itself as security for the loan, {id.)
Thayn also pledged some of the farm equipment as additional security, (id.)
It was no secret they intended to generate electricity, in fact, there was an article in
the Sun Advocate about a local farmer wanting to develop a power project, {id. at 52). There
was no copy of the52 amendment included in the National Hydro FERC application, {id. at
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55). National Hydro proposed a 5,000 cfs water consumptive right including the 600 of
Thayns. (id.) Leon was present when the National Hydro contract was executed, and a copy
was given to the canal company, (id. at 57). GRCC never objected to the fact that Thayns
were reserving 600 cfs out of the royalty proceeds for their pumping; there was never an
objection to it prior to 1992. (id. at 58).
Thayns relied upon the 600 cfs power right in order to go forward with the generation
project, (id. at 60). The whole purpose was to produce enough power to pay to pay for the
improvements and expenses necessary to do the repairs, (id.) National Hydro decided not
to go forward because Fish and Wildlife would not approve the project, (id. at 61). Thayns
decided to go forward with some of the project, and a study was done to see if the smaller
scale project could be accommodated by Fish and Wildlife, (id. at 64-66). Thayns would
have to flush the raceway channel out at least twice a month by closing the gates to their
turbines and opening the radial gates, taking about 8 hours to flush the sand and silt out of
the channel, (id. at 68). Leon even offered to clean the raceway out at his own expense but
was not allowed to. (id. at 78). He attended a June 24, 1992 board meeting and told the
board they had a 600 cfs for non-consumptive use. No objection was raised by the board at
that time. (id. at 80).
On August 4, 1992, they had another meeting wherein GRCC said it only recognized
435 not 600; Thayn learned of the 52 amendment at that time. (id. at 82-83). The list of
expenses and costs to do the co-generation project totaled some $355,000. (id. at 101). Leon
denied ever telling Vetere or Mr. King that the power would only be for pumping. (R. 1902,
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V.IIL, pp. 5-6). There were visitors to the site including tours from SCS and CED in 1990.
They had met with GRCC on January 15, 1982 and March 13, 1982 as well as September
29, 1982 after taking over operation on the Wilson farm. (id. at 56). Those meetings were
for the purpose of the National Hydro project which proposed some 4,100 cfs in addition to
Thayn's 600 cfs. (id. at 63). The original raceway was designed to carry 1,000 cubic feet per
second, (id. at 64). He didn't know if the canal company was ever given written notice, but
that they did receive verbal notice that the National Hydro project did not go through and
that Thayns intended to do the current project, (id. at 65-66). In 1989 they received approval
from FERC to allow them to do the co-generation project, (id. at 76). At that time they still
were concerned about funding the project, (id. at 83).
The new project started around the summer of 1990 when they bought the first
equipment and decided to do the project one stage at a time so as to not interrupt the
irrigation water for farming to Thayn's ranch, (id. at 90-98). They hired Rick Kaster to work
on the improvements of the building in 1989. (zW. at 125). Leon is a 25% owner in the power
plant itself, along with Mr. Kaster and Lee. (id. at 132). In 1990 they found some used
equipment which would meet the needs of their plant and obtained financing to proceed, (id.
at 143).
Rick Kaster testified that he did the actual reconstruction and power plant building
work. (id. at 176-180). He understood Thayns had a 600 non-consumptive use which was
a factor in his interest in doing the project, (id. at 182). He signed on the loan at Zions with
Lee and Leon. ( R. 1902, V. IV, p. 6). There were a lot of visitors from 1990-1992 and no
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one was ever denied the opportunity to go through the plant if they wanted to. (id. at 9).
Rick owns 50% of the surplus energy over and above that required for Lee's pumping of
irrigation, (id. at 30). He would not have gone forward with the project if there had been any
doubt about the 600 cfs that they had. (id. at 82). He had met with the canal company and
had never turned down a request to meet with them. (id.).
Lee and Leon dissolved their partnership in the farm in 1993 due to Leon's
retirement, (id. at 98). All three (3) were still partners in the co-generation project, (id.).
Rick had told Blaine Stillman, Bruce Nelson and Gary Eckhert that they were going to
generate power for sale. (id. at 122).
Leon Thayn was again re-examined regarding the meeting of 3/14/89 with GRCC
wherein he said GRCC would be sharing power as previously agreed. The only agreement
he was aware of was the National Hydro contract. (R. 1902, V. V., pp. 33-34).
GRCC then called John Vetere who attested he was the president of the canal
company in 1981 and he had never been told about the change application of Wilson to year
round use. (id. at 95). He attested the water shortage problems began in 1962. (id. at 100).
Every year since 1992 there had been a shortage of water, (id. at 101). He learned of the
power project in about 1991 or 1992. (id. at 108). Robert Quist, shareholder of GRCC, was
called and attested he learned that Thayns were generating power for sale in 1992 and had
no knowledge of the present project before then. (id. at 135). He acknowledged that Thayns
appeared at board meetings when they were asked to and answered questions when they
were asked, (id. at 137).
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Edward Hansen was called, who was on the board of directors of GRCC from 1990
to 1995. (id. at 149). He testified that he was expecting Thayns to pay a royalty on the
power generation, (id. at 154).
Glen Baxter was called and testified that he first learned of the electrical power for
sale being done by Thayns in 1992. (id. at 178).
Judy Scott, secretary/treasurer of GRCC since 1985, attested that she wasn't aware
Thayns were building a hydro electric plant from 1985 to 1991. Jack Erwin, GRCC board
member from 1980 to 1983, 1988 to 1990, and 1993 to current attested that GRCC took no
action against Thayns to stop refurbishing of the pump house. (R. 1902, V., VI, p.48). He
attested Leon Thayn said he wasn't going to sell power in 1990. (id at 50). He further
attested that they had problems since 1992. (id. at 54).
Tim Vetere was recalled and attested that in 1992 the board made a decision that they
would talk to the Thayns about sharing the revenues the way that they had promised back
in 1985 (National Hydro), (id. at 89). He was not aware of any other promises made by
Thayns to GRCC except the National Hydro project, (id. at 94-97).
At trial Thayn also introduced Exhibit 49 which was the environmental assessment
impact statement prepared by Ron Hagan, GRCC shareholder and was almost elected board
member in the January 18,1990 annual stockholder's meeting. (R. Ex. 99,1/09/90 minutes).
This environmental study was sent to Leon Thayn after doing an impact study of the
proposed co-generation project and provided specifically, with respect to the canal company,
"The Green River Canal Company & local farmers and area residents are in favor of this
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project. Not aware of anyone opposed to this project". (R. Ex. 49, p. 3) {emphasis added}.
Thayn also admitted Exhibit 48 which was the 1982 protest to the application to increase
Thayn's water right by an additional 4,100 for the National Hydro project.

GRCC

specifically protested that. That protest was in response to an application that specified that
Thayn had already received a 600 year round use right from the State Engineer.
How can the Court rule that GRCC had no knowledge that Thayn was asserting a 600
non-consumptive use right when it, in fact, protested an application which, by its very terms,
declared such right of record? Thayn also submitted the minutes of GRCC which showed
that on January 8,m 1985 the minutes of GRCC reflect that Leon Thayn explained about his
new deal, he said he would mount a new agreement with the canal company that would
eliminate the National Hydro. (Ex. 99, 1/8/85 minutes). The March 14, 1989 minutes of
GRCC reflect that "Jack Erwin asked if they were going to put power in there. Leon said
the building was being put in with that capacity. If something developed, the canal company
would share in power as previously agreed". (R. Ex. 99, 3/14/89 minutes). And finally, the
minutes of January 7, 1992 state:
Gene Dunham asked about the raceway and status with Thayns on power
plant. Some discussion by stockholders who were there when commitments
were made as to canal co.s' status. Need to review previous agreement and
update if needed. Judy referred to minutes for the 3/14/89 meeting when Leon
Thayn was present. Gene Dunham and Clell Duncan said they had discussed
this with Leon at a Soil Conservation meeting recently and he indicated the
first couple of years would be very costly but the 3 to 5 year period should
have some revenue. Indicated that 1 Vi cents is what UP&L will pay." (Ex.
98 1/7/92 minutes)
To find that GRCC was in the dark about the plans of the Thayns to build a power
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plant based upon its own minutes, the testimony of its own board of directors, and the
evidence as set forth above is preposterous and disingenuine.

It's clear that GRCC

knowingly allowed Wilson to increase his water right to 600 cfs year round because he was
"a good ole boy".
GRCC had, in opposition to this evidence, the testimony of Tim Vetere and the
testimony of the secretary/treasurer, all of whom took their respective offices in
approximately 1991 or thereafter, who say they did not know of the intention of Thayn to
go forward with hydro electric power until after the plant was online in 1992. However, that
testimony cannot be reconciled with those who were in the position of power at GRCC at
the time, in question, i.e. after the National Hydro project up until the construction began.
Accordingly, this Court should find that the Findings of Fact set forth above are not
sustainable by the evidence and, in fact, are contrary to it. See e.g. Keith MacKay and State
Stone, Inc v Roy E. Hardy and Rex L. Jackson, 973 P.2d 941 (Ut. 1998) (proper remedy for
a mistake in the Findings of Fact is to appeal and challenge the findings under the clearly
erroneous standard.
For the foregoing reasons the matter should be reversed and the Court should direct
the lower court to enter findings in accordance with the overwhelming weight of the
evidence and afford Defendant Thayn its defense under all three (3) theories, i.e. estoppel,
waiver, and latches.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the lower court should be reversed under
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issue numbers I, II, III, IV, V, and VI. In the alternative, judgment should be reversed and
remanded for further proceedings under VII, and VIIL Thayn should be awarded his costs
and attorney's fees on appeal.
DATED this

]yL day of November, 2001.

f\AilJi^
STEVEN A. WUTHRICH

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on the Z^f day of November, 20011 mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Appellant Brief to the following:
J. Craig Smith
Nielsen & Senior
60 East South Temple, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee

63

PENDIX OF TH j i APPELLANT
*1952Ammendment
,
1952 Agreement
—
Judgment on the First, Fourth, Eighth and Nir' h Causes of Action
Findings of Fact and Conclusions Of Law
,,_
Order and Judgment on Attorney's Fees
Memorandum Decision Regarding Estoppel, Waiver and Latches
Order Granting Summary Judgment on Eighttiand Ninth Causes of Action
Supplemental Ruling on Motion in Limine..... IW
Ruling on Motion to Reconsider Ruling on M|B>n or Summary Judgment
Ruling on Motion to Strike and Reciprocal MiRms for Summary Judgment
Order on Summary Judgment
1IH

A
B
C
D
.....E
F
.....G
H
I
J
....K

Tab A

A G R E E

M E N I

This agreement made and entered into this ~3 O
?^—^=£*~-.

day of

, 1952, by and between the GREEN RIVER CANAL

COMPANY, a Utah Corporation, First Party, and S. M. WILSON, STEWART
B. WILSON, LORIN H. WILSON , M. J. WILSON and F. M. WILSON, doing
i

business as co-partners under the name and style of WILSON PRODUCE
COMPANY, Second Party,
WITNESSETH:
WHEREAS, the parties hereto made and entered into an
agreement under date of April 5, 1952, the purpose and intent of
which agreement was to fix and determine the respective parties*
rights and obligations with respect to a certain dam and diverting
works jointly used by the said parties, and situated on the Green
River, in Emery County, Utah; and
WHEREAS, there has arisen some question as to the intent
and meaning of the paragraph numbered 6 of said agreement; and
WHEREAS, it is the mutual desire of the parties hereto
to dispel any doubt as to what was tniended by said paragraph 6,
and to settle the meaning thereof, beyond question;
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises fcnd of
the mutual covenants and agreements set forth in said original
agreement and by way of supplement to said original agreement, it
is hereby mutually understood and agreed as follows:
lm

That the meaning of paragraph 6 of said original

agreement was intended to be that the first party should have a
priority of diversion, and should be entitled to take whatever
water should be needed by the said first party or its stockholders
before the second party should be entitled to divert any water
through or over the dam and diversion works; and that the quantity
of water needed should be exclusively determined by the said first

-2party.

However, it was and is also mutually understood and agreed

that the first party claims for the uses of its stockholders 80
second feet of water as particularly set forth in -that certain
diligence claim No, 46 on file and of record in the office of the
State Engineer of the State of Utah and that after said rights are
satisfied through diversion at said dam and diverting works that
the water rights of the second party as set forth in its water
filing about to be issued by said State Engineer for 35 second feet
of water for irrigation uses upon approximately 1325 acres of land,
as well as its filings for power purposes to pump said water in
not to exceed 400 second feet or such lesser amount as may be
approved by the State Engineer of the State of Utah shall then be
satisfied through diversions at said dam and diverting works before any other or additional diversions are made, by the first
paxty.
2#

That this agreement, when executed by the respective

parties hereto, shall be attached to and become a part of the
original agreement more specifically described above.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have set. their
hands to this instrument in duplicate the day and year first above
written
FIRST PARTYx
GREEN RIVER CANAL COMPANY,
a corporation

Its President
ATTEST:
Tts Secretary

-3SECOND PARTIES:
WILSON PRODUCE COMPANY, a copartnership

M. WILSON
. WILSON

i2Sfe
t/ltC^c***FRANCIS M. WILSON

,

. s-> STEWART B. WILSON
LOR IN H. WILSON
Co-Partners
STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss
COUNTY OF EMERY)
,
On this S °
day
J£~^7U^L*JL1952, personally appeared
day of ^±s£2fedfe£fc-_>
f 19:
before me DELB£RT TIDWELL and O T T C T AHDERSON, who duly acknowledged
to me that they are the President and Secretary,* respectively, of
tKe Green River Canal Company, a corporation, one of the signers of
the foregoing instrument; that they signed the foregoing instrument
on behalf of said corporation pursuant to a resolution of the Board
of Directors thereof and also pursuant to a resolution of the stockholders thereof adopted at a special meeting duly called and held
for such purpose and the said officers duly acknowledged to me that
said corporation executed said agreeme;

My Commission Expires:
Residence;

STATE OF UTAH

( j / ^ t ^ ^

s / ^ ^ V ^ L

)

COUNTY OF EMERY)

ss

On this 5LJQ__ day ofJ±Ad.e3^i.,
1952, personally appeared
before me S. M. WILSON, STEWART^*. WILSON, LORIN H. WILSON, M. J.
WILSON and F. M. WILSON, co-partners, doing business under ,the name
and style of WILSON PRODUCE COMPANY, a co-partnership, the signers
of the foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that they
executed the same.

Notary Public

My Commission Expires*
Residence
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A G R E E M E N T
This agreement made and entered into this 5th day of April,
1952, by and between GREEN RIVER CANAL COMPANY, a Utah corporation
with its principal place of business at Green River, Utah, First
Party, and S. M. WILSON, STEWART B* WILSON, LORIN H. WILSON, M. J.
WILSON and F. M, WILSON, doing business as co-partners under the
name and style of WILSON PRODUCE COMPANY, Second Party,
WITNESSETH:
WHEREAS, the first party is a mutual irrigation company and
for many years has been and now is diverting waters from the Green
River in Emery County, Utah, by means of a dam across said Green
River and by use of a certain race way, canal and other diverting
works in connection therewith; and
WHEREAS, the second party is the owner of most of the lands
lying under what is commonly known as the 42-foot canal which lands
are likewise irrigated by waters diverted from the said Green River
by means of said dam and diverting works, and the w?ters are thereupon pumped from pits at the end of said race way into the said 42foot canal and thence transported through said 42-foot canal to
the said lands of the second party; and
WHEREAS, the parties hereto on January 2, 1930 made and
entered into a certain agreement pertaining to the said dam, diverting works, race way, pits and other properties situated upon
Lot 4, Section 17, T ownship 20 South, Range 16 East of the Salt
Lake Meridian; and
WHEREAS, disputes have arisen from time to time between the
parties hereto with respect to said agreement and the respective
rights and obligations of the parties hereto thereunder and an
action was filed by the first party against the Green River Irrigation Company and others in the EJistrict Court Within and for
u

<->> action the second party

appeared as an intervenor and in which action a judgment and decree
was executed on August 19, 1939 by District Judge Lewis Jones and
said judgment provided, among other things, that the second party
by reason of the said contract of January 2, 1930 was estopped to
assert or claim that the first party was not the owner of said Lot
4 and the improvements thereon so long as said contract should remain in force and effect; and
WHEREAS, it is the desire of the parties hereto to fcrever
settle and put at rest their differences and adopt a permanent
plan for the operation -of said diverting works and to also divide
the area comprising said Lot 4 between them in accordance with
their just needs and to their mutual advantage; and
T/HEREAS, on or about July 15, 1942 the Green River Irrigation Company filed an action in the District Court Within and for
Emery County, State of Utah, against the first party herein seeking to quiet title to said Lot 4 and in said action the first
party herein filed a counter-claim seeking to quiet its title to
said Lot 4 and said action has not *s yet been disposed of;
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premies and of the
covenants herein set forth and in the event and only in the event
the first party is successful in the said pending litigation between.'it and the Green River Irrigation Company, to the end that
title to said Lot 4 is finally quieted in the first party, then
it is understood and agreed as follows:
1*

Said agreement of January 2, 1930 between the parties

hereto shall be terminated.
2#

The first party shall convey to the second party by

quitclaim deed the following portions of said Lot 4 in Emery
County, State of Utah:
-2-

£izs.cl
Begin ning at the southwest corner of Lo t 4, S e c t i ojp
17, T 0 w n s h i p 20 South, Ran ge 16 E ast, S alt Lake Ba$e
and M e r i d i a n ; and running thence east 1 95 f ee t ;
thenc e n o r t h l°52 f east 28 5 feet; thenc e n o rth 0°24»
.we st 97 f e e t ; thence wast 2 00 fleet ; thencp s outh 383
'feet m o r e o r less to the p oint of begin n i n g , together
\with ail i m p r ovements ther eon and appur t e n a nces thereunto b e l o n g i n g. Subject t o the C ounty R o a d right of
way, and s u b j ect to the ri ght in the fi r s t party to
use i n c o m m o n with the sec ond par ty the p r i vate road
which l e a d s f rom the said County Road t o th e pumping
plant s i t u a t e d on the pare el of 1 and de s c r i bed in
Parce 1 B of p aragraph 2 . o f this agreem e n t and subject also to a right of wa y in th e firs t p a rty which
is pa rticular ly described as foil ows :
Beginning at a point 195 feet east of the southwest
corner of said Lot 4 artd running thence north* 50 feet;
thence west to the said County Road right of way;
thence southerly along said County Road right of way
to a point due west of the place of beginning; thence
east to the point of beginning*

Beginning at a point 245 feet east and 170 feet north
of the southwest corner of Lot 4, Section 17, ^ownship
20 South, Range 16 East of the Salt Lake Base and
Meridian; and running thence south 80° 0 0 ' east 69 feet;
thence north 6° 0 0 f east 220 feet; thence north 87° 00*
wesx 55 feet; thence south 13° 00 • east 90 feet; thence
south 7° 3 0 ' west 110 feet more or less to the point of
beginning, together with all improvements thereon and
appurtenances thereunto belonging.
3.

The second party shall make, execute and deliver to the

first party a quitclaim deed to the following described real property in Emery County, State of Utah:
All of said Lot 4, less the lands described
No* 2 immediately next preceeding*
4.
control

^he ownership,

and o p e r a t i o n

situated
agreement

upon

supervisioft,
with

of the said

the r e a l

as w e l l

maintenance,

upkeep,

as t h e o w n e r s h i p ,
and o p e r a t i o n

the f i r s t p a r t y

at all times*

repair,

supervision,

r a c e w a y and d i v e r t i n g

property described

control

in paragraph

-3-

in p a r a g r a p h

maintenances,

3 . of t h i s

upkeep,

o f said d a m s h a l l

works

repair,

be and r e m a i n

The ownership, maintenance,

upkeep, repair, supervision, control and operation of said diverting works situated upon the lands hereinabove described in paragraph 2, shall be and remain with the second party.

Each party

agrees to keep the portion of said diverting works under its supervision in a state of reasonably good repair and condition so that
insofar as the diverting works situated on the lands described in
paragraphs 2.and 3. respectively of this agreement are integral
to or essential to the use, operation and enjoyment of the other
party that the same v/ill be maintained and kept in reasonably good
repair and condition at all times.

In this connection it is under-

stood and agreed that the water belonging to the second party oust
be diverted by means of said dam and by means of the said race way
and diverting works situated on the lands described in paragraph
3. hereof and the second party agrees to annually pay on or before
the 1st day of February of each year commencing with the year 1953,
one-half of the cost of the maintenance, control, supervision, repair, upkeep and operation of said dam, diverting works, race way
ana all other property described in paragraph 3* which are jointly used by the parties hereto.

The first party shall furnish to

the second party on or before the 1st day of January of the year
1953 and on or before January 1 of each succeeding year an itemized statement of the said expenses for the preceeding twelvemonth period.

It is specifically provided, however, that if the

first party receives from any other person, firm or corporation,
any consideration in money,,work or otherwise for the maintenance,
upkeep,~repair, supervision or control of said dam, diverting works,
race way or lands adjacent thereto which are jointly used by the
parties then and in that event the consideration so received shall
first be deducted from the whole of said expenses and .after said
deductions the remainder of said expenses shall be divided equally
between the parties hereto.

The second party shall pay its own

and repair of the race way, pits and diversion works situated upon
the property hereinabove described

in paragraph 3,

In the event

the second party fails to pay its portion of said costs and expenses as herein provided the second party shall not have the
right to receive or divert any water through said diverting works
until said costs shall have been paid together with interest on
any delinquent sum at the rate of eight percent (B%) per annum.
This remedy is specified for the benefit of the first party and
is optional, cumulative and not exclusive.

In other words, the*

first party may at its option also bring suit to enforce the pay- ment of such amount or may pursue any other remedy* which* mary be
available at law or equity.
•5.

Each party hereto shall have the right at all reasonable

times to enter upon and pass over the property of the other hereinabove described in connection with the reasonable use to be made
by each party of the land to be quitclaimed to it as hereinabove
particularly set forth and in particular but not by way of limitation the first party shall have a right cf way to r.ross over the
area which is now covered with planks in front of the pumping plant
situated on the lands described in parcel 3 of paragraph 3 qbovp
and the road way leading thereto from the County Road.
6.

It is understood and agreed that before the party of the

second part can or may use any water from said dam, diverting works
or race way that the first party shall have enough and sufficient
water to supply its stockholders.

The quantity of water to supply

the stockholders of the first party is to be exclusively determined
by the first party,
7.

This agreement shall constitute a covenant running with

the said lands in said Lot 4 insofar as the respective-parties,
their successors and assigns are concerned, and it shall be binding
upon and shall inure to the benefit of the successors and assigns

of the respective parties.
agreed

In this connection

that the second party contemplates

it is understood

and

the formation of an irri-

gation company to handle 'and distribute waters under the said 4 2 foot canal and that when and if any such company

is formed by the

second party then the second party shall have the right to convey
the lands described

in paragraph 2 . of this agreement to such new

company and to assign this contract thereto.

Neither the second

party, nor its successor or assigns or their successive

successors

or assigns shall have the tight to make any such transfer and/or
assignment to more than one corporation or partnership at any particular time because to so do would unduly burden the first party
in its administration of said dam, race way and diverting works
and in the collection of the monies to be paid by the second party,
its successors and assigns.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have set their hands
to this instrument in duplicate the day and year first above written,

FIRST PARTY;
ATTEST:

It's Secretary

GREEN RIVER CANAL COMPANY, a
dorporation

By , g ^ g f ^ & ^ ^ ^ * ^ ^
It s

President

SECOND-PARTY:
WILSON^PRODUCE COMPANY, a
c o-p^ufflLe r^h i j

]

12bL&Ld^.,<J^1J\*>\

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF EMERY)

ss

Personally appe ared before rae this 3 ^ day of April, 1952,
DELBERT TIDWELL and 0. K. ANDERSON who dul y acknowledged to me
that th ey are the Pres ident and Secretary, respectively, of the
Green R iver Canal Comp any, a corporation, one of the signers of
the for egoing instrume nt; that they signed the foregoing instruraent on behalf of said corporation pursuan t to a resolution of
the Boa rd of Directors thereof and also pu rsuant to a resolution
of the stockholders th ereof adopted at a s pecial meeting duly
called and held for su ch purpose and the s aid officers duly acknowledged to me that said corporation execute d said agreement*

y/^ommissiqn, exairf
»x

d#J&L

JL

Nota
Resid ing

.Utah

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss
COUNTY OF EMERY)
Personally appeared before me this £L2L day of April, 1952
S. M. WILSON, STEWART B. WILSON, LORIN H. WILSON, M. J. WILSON
and F. M, WILSON co-partners doing business under the name and
style of WILSON PRODUCE COMPANY, a co-partnership, the signers^of
the foregoing instrument who duly ackr/owledged to me that they —
executed--the same*

NoJ^ft-y P u U i c

My commission expires:
Residence

.rf-Utah
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J. Craig Smith (4143)
David B. Hartvigsen (5390)
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P-C
60 East South Temple, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-1900
Facsimile; (801) 532-1913

i' MAR I 4 ZOOi •
t

\

Attorneys for Plaintiff Green River Canal Company
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
GREEN RIVER CANAL COMPANY,
a Utah Mutual Water Company,
Plamtiff,

JUDGMENT ON THE FIRST, FOURTH,
EIGHTH AND NINTH CAUSES OF
ACTION, AND ON THE AFFIRMATIVE
DEFENSES OF ESTOPPEL, WAIVER,
AND LACHES

v,
LEE THAYN,

Civil No. 95-070-6174
Defendant,

Judge Bryce K. Bryner

The above-captioned matter came before this Court in a 10-day non-jury trial beginning on
May 18, 1999 and ending on June 22, 1999. Plaintiff Green River Canal Company ("Canal
Company") was represented by J. Craig Smith, David B. Hartvigsen, and Daniel J. McDonald of
Nielsen & Senior and Defendant Lee Thayn (uMi\ Thayn") was represented by Reed L. Martineau
and Rex E. Madsen of Snow, Christenscn & Martineau, The Court, having reviewed and considered
the all of the relevant evidence and law with respect to the Canal Company's First, Fourth, Eighth,
and Ninth Causes of Action as set forth in its Second Supplemental Complaint, as well as the claims
of estoppel, waiver, and laches raised by Mr. Thayn as defenses to those claims, having considered

105369.GR255.001

the arguments and memoranda of the parties and the prior rulings of the Court, having entered its
findings of fact and conclusions of law on these claims, and otherwise being fully advised in the
premises;

HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES and DECREES as follows:

1,

The Court's Order on Plaintiffs and Defendant's Motions for Summary Judgment

and on Defendant's Motion to Strike dated September 9,1997 and filed on September 103 1997 is
incorporated herein by this reference.
2>

The Canal Company owns the water diversion facilities on the Green River north of

the City of Green River, e.g., the dam, raceway, and control gates at the head of the raceway on the
property owned by the Canal Company.
3.

The Canal Company has the right to use the first 80 cfs diverted through the Canal

Company's diversion facilities during the irrigation season (March 15 to November 1) and the first
20 cfs during the non-irrigation season (November 2 to March 14).
4.

Mr. Thayn has the right to use the iiQxt 35 cfs for irrigation purposes during the

irrigation season and up to 400 cfs during the irrigation season to pump the irrigation water up to Mr.
Thayn's canal.
5.

Mr. Thayn is permanently enjoined from using the Canal Company's diversion

facilities to divert water for any other purposes other than for irrigation and for generating power to
pump said irrigation water up to Mr. Thayn's canal, unless and until he obtains that Canal
Company's express written consent and agreement to the use of its diversion facilities for such
purposes.

105369.QR2J5.001
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6.

Mr. Thayn is permanently enjoined from using the Canal Company's diversion

facilities to divert any more than 35 cfs of for irrigation purposes and up to 400 cfs of water for
generating power to pump said irrigation water up to Mr. Thayn* s canal, unless and until he obtains
that Canal Company's express written consent and agreement to the use of its diversion facilities for
such additional quantities.
7.

Mn Thayn is further enjoined permanently from diverting any water for any purposes

until the Canal Company has received its full entitlement to 80 cfs of water during the imgation
season and 20 cfs of water during the non-irrigation season.
8.

Mr. Thayn is ordered to pay S7.518.50 in attorney fees incurred by the Canal

Company in defending against Mr. Thayn's efforts to obtain a temporary restraining order and a
preliminary injunction, plus $1,614.00 in attorney fees and 5734,00 in costs incurred by the Canal
Company in defending against Mr, Thayn's efforts to appeal the Court's ruling on said temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction, for a total of $9,866.50.
9.

ML Thayn is ordered to pay all taxable costs associated with the Canal Company's

Causes of Action, other than the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Causes of Action which dealt with the
trespass portion of the case.

DATED this 4 2 . day of ^y/Ui^iL

,2001.
BY THE COURT:

U^/CJ^-71
rr-

v

Bryce PyBryner, Judge
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>***#*?**

Approved as to Form:

Reed L. Martineau
Rex E. Madsen
Counsel for Mr. Tliayn

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

day of

, 2001, a true and correct

copy of the foregoiug JUDGMENT ON THE FIRST, FOURTH, EIGHTH AND NINTH CAUSES
OF ACTION, AND ON THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES OF ESTOPPEL, WAIVER, AND
LACHES was mailed, first-class, postage prepaid to the following:

Reed L, Martineau, Esq,
Rex E. Madsen, Esq.
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
10 Exchange Place, #1100
P. O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 95070S174 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

Mail

Dated this

m

day of

AWA

NAME
REED L. MARTINEAU
ATTORNEY
10 EXCHANGE PLACE, 11TH
FLOOR
P.O. BOX 45000
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 8414S
J CRAIG SMITH
ATTORNEY
SO E. SOUTH TEMPLE; BOX
11808
SUITE 110 0, EAGLE GATE PLAZA
SALT LAKE CITY UT 841111004
20 0/

TabD
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J. Craig Smith (4143)
David B. Hartvigsen (5390)
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P-C.
60 East South Temple, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-1900
Facsimile: (801) 532-1913

v

COUriT/£l/.?R

Attorneys for Plaintiff Green River Canal Company
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
GREEN RIVER CANAL COMPANY,
a Utah Mutual Water Company,
Plaintiff,
v.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW REGARDING
ESTOPPEL, WAIVER, AND LACHES

Civil No. 95-070-6174

LEE THAYN,
Judge Brycc K. Bryner
Defendant,

The abovc-captioned matter was tried before the Seventh District Court, the Honorable Bryce
IC Biyner presiding, in a 10-day non-jury trial beginning on May 18, 1999 and ending on June 22,
1999, Plaintiff Green River Canal Company ("Canal Company") was represented by J, Craig Smith,
David B> Hartvigsen, and Daniel J. McDonald of Nielsen & Senior and Defendant Lee Thayn ("Mr.
Thayn") was represented by Rccd L. Martineau and Rex E. Madsen of Snow, Chrislcnscn &
Martincau. Having reviewed and considered the relevant evidence and law with respect to the claims
of estoppel, waiver, and laches raised by Mr. Thayn as defenses to the enforcement of the terms of
1952 Agreement and Amendment and having considered the arguments and memoranda of the
parties, the Court enters its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as follows:
105369.GR255.001

FINDINGS OF FACT
(General)
1.

The Canal Company owns certain water diversion facilities on the Green River north

of Lhc City of Green River, e.g., a dam, raceway, and control gates at the head of the raceway utilized
by the Canal Company and Mr. Thayn.
2.

The Canal Company has a diligence water right with an 1880 priority for 80 cfs

during the irrigation season and 20 cfs during the non-irrigation season to be diverted through said
diversion facilities.
3.

In 1933, Mr. Thayn's predecessor, Wilson Produce, filed an application for 35 cfs of

water for irrigation purposes, also to be diverted through said diversion facilities,
4.

The Canal Company and Wilson Produce, entered into an agreement and an

amendment thereto in 1952 ("1952 Agreements") which set forth the rights and obligations of the
two parties with respect to Wilson Produce's the use of the Canal Company's diversion facilities.
5.

In 1974, Wilson Producefiledan application with the State Engineer to allow for the

diversion of 600 cfs for "power to pump" purposes during the irrigation season.
6.

In 1981, Mr, Thayn, as successor to Wilson Produce, filed a change application with

the State Engineer seeking to change the period of use of that 600 cfs to year-round. The application
did not seek to change the nature of use of the water.
7>

The Canal Company did not protest either application and both were approved by the

State Engineer of Utah.
8.

In a 1983 agreement between the parties as part of the proposed "National Hydro

Project5' that later failed, Mr. Thayn acknowledged that the total capacity of the raceway at that time
was 600 cfs.
105369.GR255.001
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9.

The Canal Company has therightto the first 80 cfs in the raceway and Mr. Thayn has

the right to 35 cfs for irrigation, thus leaving a maximum of only 485 cfs in the raceway for other
purposes, such as pumping, as opposed to 600 cfs.
10.

In about 1987 or 1988, Mr. Thayn began renovating and updating his pump house,

which is at the end of the Canal Company's raceway.
11.

In July of 1990, Mr. Thayn first formed an intent to proceed with hydro-clcctric

power generation for commercial sale.
12.

Mr. Thayn began generating hydro-electric power for commercial sale in April of

13.

Immediately after Mr. Thayn began generating hydro-clcctric power for commercial

1992.

sale, Mr. Thayn's diversion rates increased and the Canal Company began experiencing problems
in obtaining a constant flow of 80 cfs.
14.

Mr. Thayn first asserted his claim to a right to use the Canal Company's diversion

facilities to divert 600 cfs for commercial power generation at a board meeting of the Canal
Company on June 24,1992, at which time an objection to that claim was immediately voiced by the
Canal Company.
15.

Mr. Thayn first learned of the 1952 Amendment in August of 1992 when he was

being questioned in a Canal Company Board Meeting about his commercial hydro-clcctric project
and the water diversion problems,
16.

Between 1992 and 1995 when this action was filed, the Canal Company initiated

ongoing discussions regarding these problems with Mr. Thayn.
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17.

Mr. Thayn's water diversion rates were measured at 638 cfs in February of 1993 as

shown in Mr. Thayn's 1997 Proof of Diversion filed with the State Engineer on the 600 cfs water
right.
18.

Recent measurements have shown that Mr. Thayn was diverting as much as 750 cfs

on May 5, 1999.
19.

Prior to the 1993 flow measurement, neither party knew how much water Mr. Thayn

was diverting.
20.

Mr. Thayn never notified the Canal Company of his intent to generate electrical

power for commercial sale.
(Waiver)
21.

The Canal Company did not intend to relinquish either the quantity or nature of use

limitations in the 1952 Agreements.
22.

The Canal Company did not make a distinct relinquishment of the quantity or nature

of use limitations.
23.

The Canal Company did not know, nor sshould have known, that Mr. Thayn was

unaware of the 1952 Agreements prior to August of 1992.
(Laches)
24.

There was no lack of diligence on the pari of the Canal Company.

25.

Mr. Thayn did not suffer an injury as the result of any lack of diligence on the part

of the Canal Company.
(Estoppel)
26.

Leon Thayn told certain board members of the Canal Company that the pump house

facilities were in need of refurbishing and upgrading.
4
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27,

Although some of the Canal Company's board members knew that Mr. Thayn was

renovating his facilities and that generators were being delivered to the pump house, ihcy were not
aware that he was going to generate power for sale until the sspring of 1992 when Mr, Thayn began
generating commercial power and using more water.
28.

Neither Mr, Thayn nor anyone else informed the Canal Company prior to April of

1992 that Mr. Thayn was going to generate commercial power as part of the pump house facilities
renovation and upgrade project.
29.

Mr. Thayn never gave notice of any intent to divert more than 435 cfs through the

raceway in contravention of the 1952 Agreements.
30,

Mr. Thayn had no measurements showing that he or any of his predecessors had ever

diverted more than a total of 435 cfs prior to April of 1992 when he began generating power for
commercial sale.
3L

The Canal Company never acted inconsistently with respect to its contract rights

under the 1952 Agreements, specifically including the quantity and nature of use limitations
contained therein.
32.

Any injuries to Mr. Thayn were of his own making, were not caused by any action

or inaction on the part of the Canal Company, and were prior to the time when the Canal Company
learned of Mr. Thayn's intentions and claim to arightto divert 600 cfs through the Canal Company's
facilities.
///
///
///
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
(General)
1.

Mr. Thayn is the successor to Wilson Produce with respect to the 1952 Agreements.

2.

Leon Thayn and Rick Kastcr are Mr. Thayn's agents and representatives with respect

to his dealings with the Canal Company.
3.

The 1952 Agreements govern the relationship between the Canal Company and Mr.

Thayn concerning the use of the Canal Company's diversion facilities.
4.

The 1952 Agreements allow Mr. Thayn to use the Canal Company's diversion

facilities, Among other things, it establishes that the Canal Company has the right to the first 80 cfs
of water diverted through the facilities and limits the quantity of water Mr, Thayn may diverl
tlirough the facilities thereafter to a maximum of 435 cfs. It also limits the nature of use for which
such water may be diverted, i.e., up to 35 cfs may be used for irrigation purposes and up to 400 cfs
may be used to pump the irrigation water up to Mr. Thayn's own canal.
5.

Mr. Thayn is contractually prohibited from diverting water through the Canal

Company's diversion facilities for any other purposes, or in any amounts beyond those specified in
the preceding paragraph.
6.

Mr. Thayn has breached the 1952 Agreements by diverting more water than allowed

thereunder.
7.

Mr. Thayn has breached the 1952 Agreements by diverting and using water for

purposed other than those allowed thereunder.
(Waiver)
8.

The applicable burden of proof that Mr. Thayn must meet in order to establish his

waiver defense is a preponderance of the evidence,
105369.GR255.0O1
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9.

The Canal Company did not expressly waive its rights to enforce either the quantity

or nature of use limitations contained in the 1952 Agreements.
10.

The Canal Company was under no legal duty to inform Mr. Thayn of the existence

of the 1952 Agreements,
11.

Mr, Thayn bears the burden of discovering any encumbrances or limitations upon the

property and water rights he purchased from Wilson Produce.
12.

The 1974 water right application and the 1981 change application did not impose any

affirmative duty upon the Canal Company to act.
13.

The approval of said applications by the State Engineer did not grant Mr. Thayn any

right to exceed the limitations in the 1952 Agreements.
14.

Despite the approval of said applications, Mr. Thayn still needed to obtain permission

from the Canal Company before he could change or expand the quantity or nature of use limitations
in the 1952 Agreements.
15.

The approval of said applications did not affect the rights of the Canal Company

concerning the control and use of its own property, i.e, the diversion facilities and raceway.
Therefore, the Canal Company had no legal duty to act or protest said applications or approvals.
16.

Mr. Thayn has failed to meet his burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence

as to any of the following mandatory elements for his waiver defense: (1) a relinquishment of these
contractual rights and limitations; (2) that was clearly intended; and (3) distinctly made.
17.

The Canal Company did not waive any of its rights under the 1952 Agreements and

is therefore entitled to enforce the tenms thereof as previously determined in the Court's Orders dated
September 9, 1997 and March 13, 1999.
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(Laches)
18.

The applicable burden of proof that Mr. Thayn must meet in order to establish his

laches defense is & preponderance of the evidence.
19.

Because the Canal Company had no duty to act as set forth above, there can be no

lack of diligence by the Canal Company in taking any required actions.
20.

Because there was no lack of diligence by the Canal Company, there can be no injury

to Mr. Thayn attributable to a lack of diligence.
21.

Mr. Thayn has failed to meet his burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence

as to either of the mandatory elements for his laches defense, i.e, a lack of diligence by the Canal
Company or an injury to Mr, Thayn that was caused by such a lack of diligence.
22.

The defense of laches is not applicable in this matter and therefore the Canal

Company is entitled to enforce the terms of the 1952 Agreements as previously determined in the
Court's Orders dated September 9, 1997 and March 13, 1999.
(Estoppel)
23.

The applicable burden of proof that Mr. Thayn must meet in order to establish his

estoppel defense is clear and convincing evidence.
24.

Because Mr, Thayn did not form an intent to proceed with the commeicial hydro-

electric project until July of 1990, the conduct of the parties prior to that date is irrelevant to the issue
of estoppel,
25.

The Canal Company's board members were justifiably not alarmed or put on notice

of any intent to violate the 1952 Agreements by such renovation work.
26.

The 1983 agreement between the parties with respect to the "National Hydro Piojccl"

did not constitute consent by the Canal Company to use of the laceway to divert GOO cfs because Mr.
105369 GR255 001
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Thayn had acknowledged in that same agreement that the total capacity of the raceway in 1983 was
600 cfs, which left only 485 cfs of capacity available in the raceway for other purposes. It also predated the formation of Mr. Thayn's intent to proceed with the present project.
27.

The 1981 newspaper article in the Sun Advocate did not give notice of any intent to

build the present hydro-electric project because it was vague and general in nature and preceded the
actual generation of power as well as the formation of the intent to do the present projecl by
approximately 10 years.
28.

The minutes of the Canal Company's board meetings do no evidence any awareness

by the Canal Company that Mr, Thayn was claiming arightto use Canal Company facilities to divert
600 cfs for commercial power generation until June 24, 1992, at which time an objection to that
claim was immediately voiced.
29.

Mr, Thayn's filing for and receiving a water right for 600 cfs did not impart any

notice to the Canal Company that Mr. Thayn intended to divert more than 435 cfs tliroiigh the
raceway in contravention of the 1952 Agreements.
30.

Mr. Thayn's pre-1992 actual water use did not impart any notice to the Canal

Company that Mr. Thayn intended to divert more than 435 cfs thiough the raceway in contravention
of the 1952 Agreements.
31.

Mr, Thayn's actions in renovating his facilities and adding electrical power generation

equipment without informing the Canal Company of his intentions or claim to a right to divert 600
cfs through the Canal Company's facilities were made in spite of, rather than in reliance upon, the
Canal Company's conduct with respect to its rights under the 1952 Agreements.
32.

Mr. Thayn has failed to meet his burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence

as to any of the mandatory elements for his estoppel defense, i.e.: (1) that the Canal Company's
105369 GR255.001
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conduct was inconsistent with its present claims; (2) that Mr, Thayn acted reasonably in reliance on
the Canal Company's earlier conduct; and (3) that Mr, Thayn would be injured if the Canal
Company were allowed to now change positions.
33.

The Canal Company is not estopped from asserting or enforcing any of its rights

under the 1952 Agreements and is therefore entitled to enforce the terms thereof as previously
determined in the Court's Orders dated September 951997 and March 13, 1999,

DATED this /j

day of Wh^^\

2001,
BY THE COURT:

Approved as to Form;

Rccd L. Martineau
Rex E. Madscn
Counsel for Mr. Thayn
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _ _ day of

, 2001, a true and correct

copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW REGARDING
ESTOPPEL, WAIVER, AND LACHES was mailed, first-class, postage prepaid to the following;

Reed L. Martineau, Esq.
Rex E. Madsen, Esq.
Snow, Christcnscn & Martineau
10 Exchange Place, #1100
P. O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

l05369.GR255.00t
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 950706174 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

Mail

Dated this

iffi day of h\dmh

NAME
REED L. MARTINEAU
ATTORNEY
10 EXCHANGE PLACE, 11TH
FLOOR
P.O. BOX 45000
SALT LAKH CITY, UT 84145
J CRAIG SMITH
ATTORNEY
60 E. SOUTH TEMPLE; BOX
11808
SUITE 1100, EAGLE GATE PLAZA
SALT LAKE CITY UT 841111004

20 OL

Deputy(Court Clerk

TabE

\—

,

J. Craig Smith (4143)
David B. Hartvigsen (5390)
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C.
60 East South Temple, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-1900

;
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Attorneys for Plaintiff Green River Canal Company
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
GREEN RIVER CANAL COMPANY,
a Utah Mutual Water Company,
Plaintiff,
v.

:
:

ORDER & JUDGMENT ON
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES

:
:

Civil No. 95-070-6174

LEE THAYN,
Defendant.

:
:

Judge Bryce K. Bryner

Plaintiff Green River Canal Company, following the dissolution of a temporary restraining
order issued by this Court on March 15,1999, filed an Application for Attorney Fees for Wrongfully
Obtained Injunctive Relief. Defendant Lee Thayn appealed the Court's refusal to issue a preliminary
injunction upon the termination of said order. Following the withdrawal of that appeal, the Utah
Supreme Court directed this Court to determine and award fees on appeal if it decided to award fees
on at the trial court level. The Canal Company thereafter filed a Supplemental Affidavitfor Attorney
Fees for the fees incurred on the appeal. The matter was briefed by the parties and on November 1,
2000, the Court entered a ruling awarding certain fees and costs. The Court, having considered the
arguments and memoranda of the parties and being otherwise fully advised in the premises;

HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES, and DECREES as follows:
1.

The Plaintiff is awarded judgment against the Defendant in the amount of $7,518.50

for attorneys fees (after deducting 5.0 hours of duplicated time by co-counsel during the site visit)
and no costs at the trial court level, plus $1,614.00 for attorneys fees and 5734,00 for costs on appeal,
for a total amount of S97866.50 incurred by Plaintiff in defending against Defendant's wrongful
efforts to obtain injunctive relief.

DATED this / /

day of November, 2000.

BY THE COURT:

<VA^„

^

Bryce K.7Bryner, Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this lOtft day of November, 2000, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Order & Judgment on Motion for Attorney Fees was hand-delivered to the following:

Reed L. Martineau, Esq.
Rex E. Madsen, Esq.
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
10 Exchange Place, #1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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SEVENTH DISTRICT

IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN ANXiFOI^—°—~^-^
EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

GREEN RIVER CANAL COMPANY,
Plaintiff,

)

MEMORANDUM DECISION RE
ESTOPPEL, WAIVER, AND LACHES

)

VS.

)

LEETHAYN,

)

Civil No. 950706174

)

Judge Biyce K. Bryncr

Defendant.

Under the court's prior rulings, the issues of estoppel, waiver, and laches were reserved
for trial. The court heard the sworn testimony of the witnesses, received exhibits into evidence,
and allowed counsel to file post-trial memorandum. The court has read the memorandum,
considered the evidence and the law, and now issues this memorandum decision.

I Standard of Proof
The court finds that the standard of proof as to the issue of estoppel is clear and
convincing and that the standard of proof as to the issue of laches and waiver is preponderance of
the evidence,
II. Positions of the Parties
The Plaintiff seeks to enforce the 1952 Agreement and Amendment that limits the
Defendant's use of water through the raceway to 35 cfs for consumptive use and to 400 cfs for
non-consumptive use. The Defendant defends by claiming that it filed Applications with the
State Engineer n 1974 and 1981 to increase the non-consumptive use in the raceway to 600 cfs;
that the Defendant and his predecessor in interest (Wilson Produce) have used 600 cfs
continuously for non-consumptive use; that the Plaintiff did not object to the applications for 600

cfs; that the Plaintiffs knew that the Defendant was planning on generating power for sale and
failed to timely protest the expansion of the plant; and that the Plaintiff is therefore estopped
from enforcing the 1952 Agreement and Amendment that limits the Defendant's use of the
facilities to 400 cfs for non-consumptive uses. The Defendant also claims that the Plaintiff
waived its right to limit the quantity and nature of use of the 435 cfs limitation, and thai the
Plaintiff is preventedfaylaches from enforcing the 1952 Agreements.

m. Waiver
On p, 3 of its Supplemental Post-Trial Memorandum, the Plaintiff concedes the first two
elements of waiver; (1) an existing right, i.e., the 435 cfs limitation on the quantity of water that
the Defendant may divert through the Plaintiffs facilities and the nature of the use, and (2) a
knowledge of the existence of the right, and in this particular instance, a knowledge of the
existence of the "quantity" and "nature of use" limitations contained in the 1952 Agreement and
the 1952 Amendment. The Plaintiff contests the remaining three elements and the court will
address them individually.
As to the third, fourth, and fifth elements of waiver, i.e. a relinquishment of these
limitations that was clearly intended and distinctly made,Ir the court finds as follows:
1, The Plaintiff did not make an express waiver o f its right to limit the quantity and nature
of the 435 cfs limitation- Any waiver, if made, would have to be implied.
2. With regard to whether an implied waiver was made, after reviewing the totality of the
circumstances, the court cannot find by a preponderance of the evidence that the Plaintiff clearly
intended or distinctly made a relinquishment of the quantity and nature of use limitations
imposed by the 1952 Agreement and Amendment;
A. The Plaintiffs silence complained of by the Defendant did not constitute a
relinquishment of the quantity and nature of use limitations because the Plaintiff was under no
legal duty to inform the Defendant of the existence of the 1952 Agreement and Amendment.

The court is persuaded that the Defendant bears the burden of discovering the encumbrances and
limitalions on the property and water rights he purchases, and that burden cannot be shifted to the
Plaintiff. The court also finds that the Plaintiff in this instance cannot be presumed to know that
the Defendant did not know of the existence of the Agreement, if m fact the Defendant did not
know of the Agreement until August of 1992 as he claims. Moreover, no evidence was presented
from which the court can find that the Plaintiff knew or should have known that the Defendant
was not aware of the existence of the 1952 Agreement and Amendment prior to August of 1992.
B. The court also finds that the Plaintiff was under no affirmative duty to act because
of its knowledge of the 1974 water right application for 600 cfs for power to pump water and the
1981 change application to convert that water to year around use. Even though the applications
were approved by the State Engineer, the Defendant still had to obtain permission from the
Plaintiffs to expand the limitations contained in the 1952 Agreement and Amendment. It is clear
that the approval of the application did not in and of itself impose a right to exceed the 435 cfs
limitation. Accordingly, the Plaintiff was under no obligation to protest the application because
the Defendant would still have to obtain the Plaintiffs permission to exceed the quantity of water
allowed to be diverted through the raceway.

IV Laches
To prevail on the issue of laches as a defense to the enforcement of the 1952 Agreement
and Amendment, the Defendant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence (1) a lack of
diligence on the part of the Plaintiff, and (2) an injury to the Defendant owing to such lack of
Plaintiffs diligence.
From the evidence presented the court cannot find a lack of diligence on the Plaintiffs part
when it failed to protest or object to the granting of the 1974 and 1981 applications filed by
Wilson and Defendant. As discussed above in Section III, the State Engineer's approval of the
application for 600 cfs did not grant the Defendant any rights with regard to the use of the

Plaintiffs property or facilities. Because the granting of those applications did not affect the
right of the Plaintiffs to control the use of its own property, i.e., the raceway, there was no reason
for the Plaintiff to file or voice a protest or objection to the granting of the applications, and
consequently there was no legal duty of Plaintiff to protest. If there was no duty to protest, then
there can be no lack of diligence in failing to protest or object to cither of the applications.
As to the second element of laches, ie.> whether there was an injury to Defendant owing to
the Plaintiffs lack of diligence, the court finds that because there was no lack of diligence on the
part of Plaintiff there can be no injury that is attributable to the lack of diligence on the part of
Plaintiff.
From the foregoing, the court finds that the Defendant has failed to meet his burden in
justifying the application of the defense of laches to prevent the Plaintiff from enforcing its rights
under the 1952 Agreement and Amendment,

V. Estoppel
The Defendant claims that the Plaintiff had knowledge of the Defendant's activities, his
plans to generate power for sale, and his use of the water, and that the Plaintiff is therefore
estopped from enforcing the 1952 Agreement and Amendment, To prevail on the issue of
estoppel, the Defendant must prove by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the Plaintiffs
conduct was inconsistent with its present claims; (2) that the Defendant acted reasonably in
reliance on the Plaintiffs earlier conduct; and (3) that the Defendant would be injured if the
Plaintiff were allowed to now change positions. CECO Corp. v. Concrete Specialists, Inc., 772
P.2d 967, 969-970 (Utah 1989).
A. Was the Plaintiff's Conduct Inconsistent with its Present Claims? The court finds from
the testimony of the Defendant, Rick Kaster, and Leon Thayn that the Defendant did not form the
intent to proceed with the hydro-electric project until July of 1990. Therefore, the Plaintiff
cannot be charged with silence or inaction prior to the time the Defendant's intent was formed,

and there was no duty on the part of Plaintiff to take action prior to July of 1990 to counter an
intent that was not yet formed. Thus, it cannot be said that the Plaintiff had knowledge of the
Defendant's intent to do the hydro-electric project prior to July of 1990 because the Defendant
had not formed the intent until that time,
The court must now consider whether any events occurred after July ofl990 that could
have evidenced an intent on the part of the Defendant to proceed with the project, and of which
the Plaintiff had knowledge and was silent or took no action. The Defendant asserts that the
Board members knew that the generators were being placed in the pumphouse for the purpose of
generating hydro-electric power for sale. The great weight of the evidence is, however, that
although the Board members knew that the power house had been renovated, they were not
aware until the Spring of 1992 that the Defendant was going to generate power for sale; Jack
Erwin, Jay Vctcrc, Tim Vetere, and Dean King each testified that they had been told by Leon
Thayn, as the agent for Defendant, in 1990 that the Defendant was not going to generate power
for sale. The court also finds that when the generators were delivered to the pumphouse the
Board members who saw them were not aware that they were to be used to generate power for
sale. Evidence was also produced from which the court finds that Leon Thayn had told the
Board members that the pumphouse was facilities were in need of refurbishing and upgrading.
The Board members were therefore justifiably not alarmed or put on notice of intent to violate
the 1952 Agreements when the renovation work began.
The court also rejects the assertion that the National Hydro Project or the 1983 agreement
between the parties regarding the National Hydro Project evidences the Plaintiffs cousent to the
use of the raceway to divert 600 cfs. Paragraph B of the Agreement states that the total capacity
of the raceway is 600 cfs. Because the Plaintiff has the right to the first 80 cfs and the Defendant
has the right to 35 cfs for irrigation, that would leave the Defendant only 485 cfs for pumping as
opposed to the 600 cfs for pumping. This inconsistency leads the court to find that the
Agreement did not represent the Plaintiffs consent to 600 cfs being used by the Defendant.

The court also finds that the 1981 newspaper article in the Sun Advocate did not give notice
of any intent to build the present hydo-elcctric plant because it was vague and general in nature
and preceded the generation of power for sale by approximately 10 years.
The court also finds that the minutes of the Canal Company's Board Meetings do not
support the Defendant's position that the Board was aware that the Defendant claimed 600 cfs for
power generation for sale: the 1985 minutes refer only to the need for a now agreement to
eliminate National Hydro; the March 14, 1989 minutes refer only to a project in the future and do
not mention a specific cfs; and although the minutes of June 24, 1992 reveal that the Defendant
and his Brother stated to the Board that they had 600 cfs for non-consumptive use, Board
member Ted Ekkcr objected by stating that the Defendant would have to release water back or
the Canal Co. would have to take action. This represented an objection. After reviewing the
minutes submitted as evidence the court cannot find that the Plaintiffs know, prior to June 24,
1992, that the Defendant claimed the right to 600 cfs for non-consumptive use.
The court also finds that neither the 1974 Water Right Application for 600 cfs nor the
actual water use in the 1970s imparted any notice of the Defendant's intent to use water in excess
of the amount provided for in the 1952 Agreements. The court has previously Riled that an
application to appropriate water does not award the applicant the right to exceed a contract
amount. Further, the court cannot find that the Defendant was diverting more than 435 cfs prior
to April of 1992 when he began generating power.
B. Did the Defendant Act Reasonably in Reliance on the Plaintiff's Conduct?
The court finds that the Defendant has failed to meet the second requirement for equitable
estoppel, i.e., that he acted reasonably in reliance on the plaintiffs conduct. The Plaintiffs
conduct consisted of maintaining the position that the 1952 Agreements set forth the Defendant's
quantity and nature of use of the water flowing thorough the raceway, and the court cannot find
that the Plaintiff deviated from that position

The improvements made to the pumphouse,

including the ability to generate power for sale, were made by Defendants even though the

Defendant was aware of the Plaintiffs position,
C Would the Defendant be Injured if the Plaintiff were Allowed to Change Positions?
The court finds that the Defendant has not proved the third element of equitable estoppel
because the injuries of the Defendant were not caused by the action or inaction of the Plaintiff.
Rather, his injuries were of his own making. The Defendant elected to proceed with the
improvements and complete them without advising the Plaintiff until June of 1992 that he
claimed the right to divert 600 cfs and use the additional water to generate power for sale. This
was clearly beyond the time in which the Plaintiff could have or should have taken any action to
object to the excess use.
From the foregoing analysis, the court finds that the Defendant has not proved the
affirmative defenses of waiver, laches, and estoppel. The Plaintiffs counsel is directed to
prepare findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a judgment consistent with this decision,
DATED this /O

day of April, 2000.

// Bryce K. Bryncr, Mage
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J. Craig Smith, USB No. 4143
David B. Hartvigsen, USB No. 5390
Daniel J. McDonald, USB No. 7935
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C.
1100 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-1900
Facsimile; (801) 532-1913
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Attorneys for Plaintiff Green River Canal Company

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
GREEN RIVER CANAL COMPANY, a Utah
Mutual Water Company,
Plaintiff,
v.
LEE THAYN,
Defendant,

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON ITS EIGHTH AND
NINTH CAUSES OF ACTION
ENJOINING DEFENDANT FROM
INTERFERING WITH PLAINTIFF'S
PRIOR RIGHT TO USE OF WATER
AND STRIKING THE AFFIDAVIT
OF LEON THAYN
Civil No. 6174
Judge Biyce K. Bryner

The Court having reviewed and considered the Memoranda, Exhibits and Affidavits filed for
and in opposition to Plaintiff Green River Canal Company's ("Green River") Motion for Summary
Judgment on its Eighth and Ninth Causes of Action, and Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Leon
Thayn, and having considered the arguments of J. Craig Smith of Nielsen & Senior, who appeared
and argued die motions on behalf of Green River Canal Company, and the arguments of Reed

Martineau of Snow, Christenscn and Martineau, who appeared and argued against the motions on
behalf of Defendant Lee Thayn C'Thayn") at the hearing conducted on February 26, 1999, the Court
does hereby ORDER, ADJUDGE AND DECREE as follows:
ijk

1.

Green River's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted on its Eighth and Ninth

Causes of Action,
2.

Green River holds first priority to divert and place into its canal the first eighty (80)

cubic feet per second of water diverted by the low dam and diverted through the raceway and
diversion facilities of Green River during the irrigation season, March 1st through November 15th
of each year.
3.

Green River holds first priority to divert and place into its canal the first twenty (20)

cubic feet per second of water diverted by the low dam and diverted through the raceway and
diversion facilities of Green River during the non-inigation season, November 16th through
February 28 of each year.
t) K

4.

Therightof Thayn to divert and take water is subsequent and junior to Green River's

right to the eighty (80) cubic feet per second during the irrigation season and twenty (20) cubic feet
per second during the balance of the year as set forth herein.
5,

In the event that Green River is not receiving its entire water right as set forth herein,

Thayn shall not divert or take any water.
6.

Thayn is permanently enjoined from encroaching upon or interfering with Green

River's right to divert eighty (80) cubic feet per second of water into its canal during the irrigation
season, and twenty (20) cubic feet per second during the balance of the year.

90CiS.GR255.001
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The priority of the diversion of water and the quantity of Green River's right arc

enforceable by the powers of this Court to enforce injunctions issued by this Court.
8.

The Affidavit of Leon Thayn submitted in opposition to Summary Judgment is

stricken as hearsay, and as attempting to controvert facts previously admitted by Thayn.
DATED this M J L day of March, 1999.
BY THE COURT

HonoraKmBryce K. Bryner
Disti^yCourt Judge
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
GREEN RIVER CANAL COMPANY,
a Utah Mutual Water Company,

RULING ON MOTION TO RECONSIDER
RULING ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
LEE THAYN,
Defendant.

Civil No. £174

On March 26, 1999f the Defendant filed a motion requesting the
court to reconsider its ruling on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment

dated July ll/

1997.

The court has considered the

memorandum of counsel and the oral arguments presented on April 26,
1999, and now issues this ruling.
The court is persuaded by the cases cited by Defendant that
this court has the authority to reconsider its previous ruling on
the motion for partial summary judgment. However, the court is not
persuaded that the motion to reconsider raises any legal theories
or any new material facts that were not considered by the court at
the time of the previous ruling on the motion for summary judgment.
The motion to reconsider is therefore denied.
DATED this ^Cr

day of April, 1999.
<2-£L-

«r<3.

BRYCE lOT BRYNER
District Court Judge
Sipabrc zv$ p f t a h appeal d ibove-narn&i Adgs ty:
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CERTIFICATE QF FAILING
I hereby certify that on the

day of April, 1999, a true

and correct copy of the foregoing RULING ON MOTION TO RECONSIDER
RULING ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT was mailed, postage prepaid,
to the following:
J. Craig Smith
David B. Hartvigsen
Daniel J. McDonald
Attorneys at Law
1100 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Reed L, Martineau
Rex. E Madsen
Attorneys at Law
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145

'Mso

l a co»<plionC« yifch fch« Ai^s'icort* w i t h D i s a b i l i t i e s Act,
i n d i v i d u a l s n e e d i n g n p o c i a l accommodation:! ( i n c l u d i n g
cotmiunicative aidil and a e r v i c e o ) d u r i n g cMff prOC9caing
Should COll 1 - 8 0 0 - 9 7 2 - 1 0 7 2 , ftC l e a a t THRSE working
d a / a p c i c r t o the dcheduled p r o c e e d i n g .
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r» THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COTOT
IN
E S H Y COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

rPEEN RIVER CANAL COMPANY,
f UtahMutual Water Company,

RULING ON MOTION TO F"J _M
SECOND AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM

Plaintiff/

vs
LEE THAYN,
Defendant

Civil No. 6174

Trial in this matter is scheduled to begin on May 18, 1999,
and the Defendant's motion was filed on March 26, 1999.

The

Plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition and the Defendant filed
a reply.

Oral argument was conducted on April 26, 1999, The court

has considered the memorandum and the arguments of counsel and now
issues this ruling.
The motion to file a Second Amended Counterclaim is denied for
the reason that it is untimely, i.e., filed one week after the
close of discovery and less than two months before trial,

The

court finds that the Plaintiff would be prejudiced by (1) not being
able to engage in reasonable discovery, and (2) by not having time
to prepare and assert a defense to the counterclaims.
only be cured by granting a continuance of the trial,

This could
The court

declines, however, to continue the trial for the reason that

2

several continuances have been had by the Defendant, and the
Plaintiff is entitled^-fco have his complaint heard.
DATED this
day of April, 1999.

f f
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

GREEN RIVER CANAL COMPANY,
a Utah Mutual Water Company,

:
:

PARTIAL RULING ON GREEN
RIVER'S MOTION IN LIMINE

Plaintiff,
vs.
LEE THAYN,

j
Defendant.

;

Civil No. 6174

Plaintiff file a Motion in Limine to which the Defendant filed
a Memorandum in Opposition.

Plaintiff filed a Reply and oral

argument was conducted on April 26, 1999,

The court took the

matter under advisement and now issues this partial ruling on two
of the three issues raised by Plaintiff in its motion.

The court

will issue a supplemental ruling on the issue of whether the
Defendant

should be barred from introducing

evidence

to show

estoppel.
I.

FAILURE TO SUPPLEMENT DISCOVERY REQUESTS

At oral argument on March 16, 1999, the court ruled from
the bench that the Defendant is barred from introducing at trial
evidence, documents or witnesses that were not disclosed in his
answers to Plaintiff's discovery requests.

Upon further review,

the court amends the order from the bench as follows:

2

1.

The Defendant is barred from introducing at

trial any evidence, exhibit prepared by, or testimony fromr any
expert witness that was not disclosed in Defendant's answers to
Plaintiff's discovery requests.

Pursuant to Rule 26(e)(1)(B) Utah

Rule of Civil Procedure, the Defendant was under a duty to
supplement his answers as to experts without

a request

for

supplementation from Plaintiff*
2.

The Defendant is barred from introducing any

witness, evidence, or document from any person having knowledge of
discoverable matters whose identity and location were not disclosed
in Defendant's answers to Plaintiff's discovery requests. See Rule
26(e)(1)(A), Utah Rule of Civil Procedure.
3-

The Defendant is barred from presenting any

evidence, witness, or document that has the effect of amending any
prior discovery response if the Defendant knew the response was
incorrect when made, or knows that the response, though correct
when made, is no longer true and the circumstances are such that a
failure

to

amend

the

response

is

in

substance

a

knowing

concealment,
The Defendant was under a continuing obligation to make
the above supplementation without being requested to do so by
Plaintiff.

The Defendant is not under an obligation, however, to

supplement any of his other previous discovery responses that were
complete when made and for which new or additional information has

3

been obtained by Defendant unless the Plaintiff has filed a request
for supplementation,
II-

SHOULD DEFENDANT BE BARRED FROM INTRODUCING EVIDENCE TO
CONTRADICT THE ADMISSIONS ON FILE?
The

Plaintiff

served

Defendant

Admiss ions dated September 24, 1998, and m

with

Requests

for

an Amended Scheduling

Order dated February 22, 1999, the court extended Defendant's time
to respond to the discovery to March 12, 1999»
in

Limine

is

granted

insofar

as

Defendant

Plaintiff's Motion
is

barred

from

introducing any evidence to contradict the Admissions that were on
file as of March 12, 1999.
DATED this £?f

day of April, 1999.

BRYeE K,y-"BRYNER^
Distri'cc Court Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MATT.TNG
I hereby certify that on the

day of April, 1999, a true

and correct copy of the foregoing PARTIAL RULING ON GREEN RIVER'S
MOTION IN LIMINE was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
J. Craig Smith
David 3, Hartvigsen
Daniel J. McDonald
Attorneys at Law
1100 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Reed L. Martineau
Attorney at Law
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
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Xn con'plinrtce with the Americana wltr* Disabilities Act,
individuals needing special acconrnodacicna (including
communicative aida and services) during tbig proceeding
ghould c a U 1-8Q0-992-1Q72, at Icanc THREE working
daya prior ta the ocheduled proceeding.
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SEVENTH OISTRICT
COURT/EMERY

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

GREEN RIVER CANAL COMPANY,
a Utah mutual water company,
Plaintiff,

RULING ON MOTION TO STRIKE
AFFIDAVIT AND RULING ON
RECIPROCAL MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendant

Civil No. 6174

vs.

LEE THAYN,

Plaintiff and Defendant filed reciprocal Motions for Summary
Judgment.

Subsequent to the hearing on oral argument the Plaintiff

submitted an Affidavit of James R. Tibbetts,

The Defendant filed

a Motion to Strike Affidavit of James R, Tibbetts, a decision on
which is material to the arguments on the reciprocal Motions for
Summary Judgment. A Notice to Submit for Decision was submitted on
May 12, 1997, and the Court now issues this Ruling.
I.

MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT

The filing of the Affidavit of James R. Tibbetts was
untimely but that defect was cured when the Defendant subsequently
submitted the "Second Affidavit of Lee Thayn".

The Court also
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finds that the Affidavit is relevant: as it addresses the issue of
whether the Defendant increased his diversion of water in 1992.
The Motion to Strike is therefore denied.
II.

ESTQPP5L

The Defendant asserts that Plaintiff is estopped front
complaining about Defendant's diversion of water because Plaintiff
did not protest Defendant's change applications and stood idly by
while

the Defendant

facilities,

invested

$300,000.00

in power

generation

The Court finds that there are genuine issues of

material fact as to estoppel, laches, and waiver, which preclude
summary judgment in favor of Defendant on this issue, e.g., whether
Plaintiff knew Defendant was intending to generate power for resale and if so, when this knowledge was obtained; the circumstances
surrounding the Hydro Power application, etc.
If, after trial on the issue of estoppel, the Court finds
that the Plaintiff is not estopped from bringing this action, the
following rulings will apply:
III.

BREACH OF AGREEMENT

The Defendant admits that he diverted water in excess of
435 cfs.

Based thereon, the Court finds that the Defendant
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breached the 1952 amendment to the agreement.

The agreement and

the amendment are unambiguous; certain, definite, and enforceable
and limit the Defendant's

diversion of water to 435 cfs for

irrigation

generation

irrigation,

and

for

power

to

pump

the

water

for

The Court rejects the notion that the agreement and

amendment only establish priorities.

It is clear to the Court that

the parties intended the amendment to Mforever settle and put at
rest their differences and to adopt a permanent plan for the
operation of the diverting works.1' The contract and the amendment
do not contemplate or provide for an enlargement of the right
beyond 435 cfs.
IV.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE AND INJUNCTION

The Court also finds that by reason of the breach, GRCC
should be entitled to an order of specific performance and an
injunction limiting the Defendant to diverting 43 5 cfs for the
specific purposes enumerated in the contract and agreement.

To

rule otherwise would sanction a continuing violation of the 1952
contract and amendment and would likely result in the parties
returning to Court numerous times in the future to consider damages
that may accrue.
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The Court also finds that there is not an adequate remedy
at law available to the Plaintiff and that it would be extremely
difficult if not impossible to prove damages with any degree of
precision because of the peculiar position of the Plaintiff.

If

the Plaintiff cannot prove the amount of his damages, only nominal
damages would be awarded which constitutes an inadequate remedy,
V.

APPLICABILITY OF SECTION,.73,-1-_?....UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
Utah case law has held that Section 73-1-7, Utah Code

Annotated, is controlling only in the absence of an enforceable
agreement regulating the use of the water and facilities as between
the

parties.

The

Court

finds

that

the

above

section

is

inapplicable to the instant fact situation for the reason that the
1952 amendment constitutes an existing and enforceable agreement
between the parties which regulates and defines their respective
rights. The Defendant cannot therefore claim that his diversion inexcess of 435 cfs was authorized by statute.
Plaintiff's counsel is directed to prepare an appropriate
summary judgment consistent with this ruling.

DATED this

//

day of July, 1997

BRYNER
BRYCS
Distbict Court Judge
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SEVENTH DISTRICT
COURT/EMERY

J. Craig Smith, USB No. 4143
David B, Hartvigsen, USB No. 5390
Annette F. Sorensen, USB No. 6989
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C.
1100 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-1900
Facsimile: (801) 532-1913
Attorneys for Plaintiff Green River Canal Company

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
GREEN RIVER CANAL COMPANY, a Utah
Mutual Water Company,
Plaintiff,

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S AND
DEFENDANTS MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ON
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE

Civil No. 6174

LEE THAYN,
Defendant,

Judge Bryce K. Bryner

The reciprocal Motions for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff and Defendant came on regularly for
hearing on the 15th day of October, 1996, before the above-entitled court, the Honorable Brycc K. Biyner,
District Judge, presiding. The Plaintiff Green River Canal Company appeared by and through its counsel, J.
Craig Smith of Nielsen & Senior, P,C The Defendant, Lee Thayn, personally appeared and was represented
by counsel, John F, Waldo of Pruitt, Gushee & Bachtcll. The Court, having reviewed the motions, supporting
memoranda and affidavits and the pleadings on file herein and having heard and considered the argiunents of
counsel, and for good cause appearing, it is hereby
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ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
RECIPROCAL MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1.

Defendant's motion for summary judgment is denied. Defendant is not entitled as a matter

of law to Summary Judgment on the Plaintiffs causes of action, and genuine issues of material fact exist as
to the affirmative defenses of estoppel, laches, and waiver asserted by Defendant, which preclude entry of
summary judgment in favor of the Defendant.
2.

Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is granted. If after trial on the issue on estoppel, the

Court finds that the Plaintiff was not estopped from bringing this action, the following rulings will apply to
Plaintiffs First, Third and Fourth Causes of Action:
(a)

The 1952 Agreement attached as Exhibit "A" to the Complaint and an Amendment

that same year attached as Exhibit "B" to the Complaint are unambiguous, certain, definite, and
enforceable and binding upon the parlies and limit the Defendant's diversion of water to 35 efs for
iirigation and up to 400 cfs for power generation to pump the water for irrigation.
(b)

The Defendant has breached the 1952 Agreement as he has admitted to diverting

water in excess of 435 cfs,
(c)

There is no adequate remedy at law available to Plaintiff Therefore, by reason of the

breach, Green River is entitled to an Order of specific performance and a Permanent Injunction
limiting the Defendant to a total of 435 cfs (35 cfs for irrigation purposes and up to 400 cfs to pump
irrigation water), and limiting the use of water to the specific purposes enumerated in the Agreement
and Amendment.
3.

The Court finds that § 73-1-7, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, is inapplicable to the present case.

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 73-1-7 is controlling only in the absence of an enforceable agreement regulating
the use of the water and facilities as between the parties. The 1952 Agreement as amended constitutes an

-"•><" GR255.001
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existing and enforceable agreement between the parties wliich regularly defines their respectiverights,and the
Defendant cannot, therefore, claim that his diversion m excess of 435 cfs was authorized by statute.
4.

The Court rejects the notion of Defendant that the Agreement and Amendment only establish

priorities as to the use of water.
5.

The Agreement and the Amendment do not contemplate or provide for an enlargement of the

Defendant's right to divert water beyond a total 435 cfs, 35 cfs for irrigation purposes and up to 400 cfs to
pump irrigation water.
MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT
1.

The Motion to Strike the Aff#avit of James R. Ttbbetts is denied.

DATED this / ^ y

o£3SgKtTl997.
BY THE COURT;

Sat

HonoralwBrycc K. Bryner
DistricMJourt Judge

Approved as to form:

'John F. Waldo, Esq.
John W. Anderson, Esq.
of PRUITT, GUSHEE & BACHTELL
Attorneys for Defendant

^

Esq.
SENIOR
intiff
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